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A Journal of Opinion

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Military Review

ONE OF the most remarkable dispatches of the war came through on April 18 over the signature of Drew Middleton of the New York *Times*. It said that the drive of General Bradley's 12th Army Group toward Berlin had ceased; that the supply situation was partly responsible, but that still more the cause was a lack of tactical coördination between the Soviet and American armies; and that, in all probability, the only contact between the Soviet forces and ours would be as they "brushed flanks during mop-up operations."

This explains a great deal and leaves a great deal more calling for explanation. It could explain, for instance, why the Germans, after the big breakthrough in the west, did little or nothing to bring the Allies to a halt short of the line of the Elbe and why, even there, their defense was anything but vigorous. They did throw the Second Armored out of its bridgehead, but the more important bridgehead at Barby was gained with comparative ease and probably could have been expanded, had the Western Allies really wished to make a fight on these terms. They did not hold Magdeburg in force, although a town on the farther bank of a river is one of the best of all positions from which to prevent a crossing. (Note that the Russians attempted nothing serious on the Oder until they had taken Küstrin and Frankfurt.) That is, the Germans seem to have known about an agreement that the Western armies should stop at the Elbe, or suspected it strongly enough to be able to act on the suspicion.

This is what the phrase "lack of tactical coördination" means. It means that two separate wars are being fought against what is left of the Reich. Early in the year, well buttered statements were issued about strategic coördination with the Soviet armies, and these have certainly been borne out in practice. The timing of the attacks from east and west could hardly have been better designed to draw the Nazis into costly movements of their troops over long distances, and the air attacks on the German transportation system have been a major cause of the general Nazi military collapse, not to mention that both east and west the reserves consistently arrived too late to do any good.

But at the present point in the war, it is tactical rather than strategic coördination that counts, and we are blandly informed that there isn't any. It is not merely a question of having Russian divisions serving under an American army command and vice versa, on the lines so well worked out with the British and the French. It is rather that there appears to be an agreement for the setting up of a military frontier between the Western Allies and the Ally in the east, along lines of prominent geographical barriers, in the north and center at least, the Elbe and the mountains that ring Bohemia.

Now this is a situation that reminds one of Napoleon's remark that he liked to fight against allies. With the Reich cut in half, it guarantees that the mop-up operations by both Russians and Americans will have to be conducted by two separate army groups, one facing north, the other south, with resultant complications of the problems of supply and troop movement, and with considerable difficulty at the two headquarters in coördinating movements. It would have been infi-

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nitely simpler to bring the wings into contact and to conduct operations in unison along lines of genuine coöperation; and the situation would offer considerable opportunities to the Germans if they still had any body of troops capable of undertaking a campaign.

As to where the blame for the failure of tactical coördination lies, the dispatches are not at all clear. But it is worth remembering that even now the military officers of Russia's allies are not allowed to visit her fighting fronts, and correspondents only get near them on rare and specially conducted tours.

In the war in the Far East dispatches from Ie report that the Japanese have extended their suicide system to infantry fighting. The method is for a little group of Japanese soldiers to get into a foxhole with some explosives, camouflage it very carefully from above and when a tank passes across it, blow themselves and the tank up together. It is not an efficient method of war. For one thing, no matter how carefully these traps are placed, there is no guarantee that a tank will cross them and, for another, in at least one reported case which is probably representative, the explosion was by no means sufficient to destroy the tank. Also a tank advance is usually preceded by neutralization fire, which probably gets most of such traps.

But it is another step along the road which began to be apparent at Attu, where less than one percent of the Japanese were taken prisoners. Reports of mass meetings in metropolitan Japan indicate that the government intends to develop this system further, to the point, indeed, where they hope to make it necessary for us to kill every adult Japanese if we want to beat Japan. They have been far more successful than the Germans so far in this counsel of desperation; to what extent they will succeed in carrying it will only become clear when landings on the Japanese islands are made.

But the idea behind it is quite clear. It is a last-ditch appeal to that American sentimentality on which they have so often counted and from which they now expect protests against devoting an entire nation to death.



Last Stand in the Reich

Dr. Goebbels, who is called upon to invent a new explanation of the war almost daily, has declared that one of the central resistance areas is around Berlin itself, and another in the northern ports. But the progress of the Soviet armies has been accompanied by such destruction of the German forces that it is a little difficult to see how they will be able to manage any retreat from the capital to the north, right across the front provided by the Elbe.

Nazi Atrocities

Unequaled in the history of mankind, the horrifying atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis in concentration camps against Allied prisoners of war, foreign political enemies as well as against Germans themselves, have justly aroused the peoples of the United Nations, and especially the people of the United States. They have convinced them that, if for no other reasons, their sacrifices in fighting this war are not in vain. As always, however, there exists a grave danger that the wrong conclusions may be drawn from the reports whose authenticity can hardly be doubted. It is well to remember, therefore, that years ago, before the war, when German political refugees first told of the terrible fate they themselves and their less fortunate comrades had suffered in Nazi concentration camps, they were either not believed by many or not taken seriously. Only now, after Allied correspondents report what has been going on behind the walls of these Nazi camps, are all the hideous stories, doubted for so long, confirmed.

Against Germans Too

The atrocities now reported were committed by Germans, not because they are Germans, but because they are fascists. They were perpetrated against foreigners and Germans alike. The Nazis did not distinguish between the German people and foreign peoples, they distinguished only between those who resisted their barbaric regime and those who did not. At the Buchenwald concentration camp after its liberation, a memorial service was held recently for those murdered by the Nazis. Surviving prisoners stood under their national flags. The flags, Marguerite Higgins reported in the New York *Herald Tribune*, "were a testament of the uprooted and the persecuted. Side by side were those of Russia, Holland, France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Italy, Czechoslovakia *and Germany, for the anti-Nazi political prisoners of that country.*" (Italics ours.) Germans, just like nationals from other countries, were victims of the Nazi crimes. Atrocities are not peculiarly German. They are an intrinsic, perhaps the most essential, feature of the fascist political system. Atrocities were committed by the Italian Fascists in Mussolini's Italy and by Darnand's fascist militia in Vichy France. They

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are still being committed in the concentration camps and prisons of fascist Spain and fascist Argentina.

Spain and Argentina

Just as we did business with Hitler and enabled him to liquidate the anti-Nazi opposition within Germany, so we are now facilitating the extermination of the democratic elements in Spain and Argentina by refusing to break with the former and actually strengthening our ties with the latter. General Franco, ever more conscious of the fact that his continuance in power depends almost solely on American and British acquiescence, is trying hard to bamboozle public opinion in the Anglo-Saxon countries by severing relations with Japan, offering political amnesty to "non-criminal" civil-war exiles, lifting the censorship on all news from Spain to the outside world, forbidding the landing of German planes on Spanish soil and, it is reported but not confirmed, abolishing or drastically limiting the use of the Falange salute and flag. But the internal terror continues in Spain, for without that terror Franco's regime would fall tomorrow.

Though more complicated, the same is true of Argentina. There are those who, like Sumner Welles, argue that political and economic pressure on that country would only have the effect of rallying the people behind the fascist regime. Even if this were true, our coddling of the Argentine fascists whom we are apparently permitting to come into the United Nations fold without exacting from them the slightest democratic guarantees, is inexcusable. Argentina's participation in the San Francisco conference should be opposed by all possible means.

Poland at San Francisco

It would certainly be one of those ironic but man-made accidents of history if Argentina, one of Hitler's last friends, were represented at San Francisco, and Poland, one of his first victims, were not. As we go to press, the deadlock over the composition of a new Polish government, agreed on at Yalta, has not been solved, and Poland is likely not to be represented unless a last-minute agreement is reached. Russia, which has now concluded a pact with the Warsaw government, is insisting on having this government represented. The United States, and probably also Great Britain, are equally determined to prevent it, unless democratic Polish leaders in exile such as Peasant Party leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk or Socialist Jan Stanczyk, who are willing to coöperate with the Lublin Poles, are included in its composition. Both are men whom the Russians could trust as good neighbors.

The Russian attitude in the Polish question, so different from their attitude toward other former enemy statesmen like Baron Mannerheim in Finland, for instance, is difficult to comprehend. So far, at least, no satisfactory explanation has been given by the Russians. A probable reason is that the Lublin Poles, whose hold on the Polish people is said to be still rather weak, fear the return of as popular a leader as Mikolajczyk, who might well steal the show from them. And Moscow, though perhaps not sharing them, seems to uphold these fears. From a diplomatic point of view, however, the stand taken on the Polish question by the United States and Great Britain is justified in view of the Yalta agreement and should be sustained. The Yalta formula was itself a compromise, and further concessions seem unwarranted.

Keeping Pacific Islands

Those members of Congress and spokesmen of the navy who are supporting permanent seizure by the United States of the Pacific islands won from Japan, without a mandate or any form of international trusteeship, should be aware that in doing so they are opposing the stand of their own government and supporting that of Britain, France, the Netherlands and Russia. The governments of these countries would be only too glad to have the United States assert this right, because then we could have nothing to say about their colonies and bases, and they need not share any of the expense or responsibility for ours.

The question is, however, whether such a disposal of territory corresponds with the rights of self-determination and self-government proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, or with the practical needs of maintaining future peace. Are we, after all, fighting for the right of conquest and do we intend in the future to defend ourselves solely by our own action? Certainly American boys have paid for these islands with their blood, but were they sent to their deaths for a few square miles of territory, or for a world secure against war and marked by international coöperation?

Nobody proposes that we shall not govern the bases we need, or that they shall not at all times be open to us. But such an arrangement is perfectly compatible either with the mandate system or with some new form of international trusteeship. At the very least, if the combined general staff of the International Security Organization is to mean anything, it must have the opportunity to use in common all necessary bases, both those in our hands and those governed by others.

President Truman's Honeymoon

President Truman's first week of administration has been both good in substance and reassuring in manner. He has worked hard, he has acted, he has carried on the tasks of his predecessor, he has made no apparent mistake, he has created a favorable impression among newspapermen and members of Congress. We do not wish to detract from the good opinions he has earned by pointing out that almost any President is given the benefit of every doubt in the early days of his administration; hope combines with a spirit of fair play to

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bring this about. The real test will come not this week or next but after some months.

In spite of his virtues, Mr. Truman is no magician. He cannot keep the support of the Republicans and of the reactionary Southern Democrats and at the same time build a reliable world peace and an America which can provide enough jobs to returning soldiers. Let us hope he can command the votes of enough of them to put through a decent program. But if, after the first year, they are as cordial to him and his ideas as they now appear to be, it will be because he has surrendered to them, not because he has powers to hypnotize them which Franklin D. Roosevelt lacked.

The Best on Bretton Woods

Explanations and critical appraisals of Bretton Woods have been issued by the hundred, but by all odds the best we have seen is that just made public by the International Committee of the National Planning Association. This committee contains bankers, businessmen, leaders of labor and farmers, competent economists. The report explains briefly the technical features both of the Stabilization Fund and the International Bank. It considers carefully the objections and proposals for amendment. More than that, it describes the actual background of the draft agreement in the potential conflict between American and British international economic policies. We want multilateral trade without discrimination; there is a strong tendency in Britain to seek economic insulation against us. Bretton Woods is the only possible kind of compromise; if it fails, it will be difficult to pick up the pieces.

The NPA Committee therefore recommends ratification of both Fund and Bank without amendment. Any fair-minded opponent of ratification should read and ponder this report. It comes from a more representative source than any other; it is itself a better, more comprehensible and more complete piece of work. We do not see how it can be refuted.

Doyle in the Philadelphia Record

Poll-Taxers in Congress

One of the hottest of hot potatoes to come before Congress in some time was deposited with the clerk of the House a short time ago. The Southern Electoral Reform League has demanded that 68 members of Congress from Southern poll-tax states shall be unseated. The argument is that the poll tax in these states—Alabama, South Carolina, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee and Virginia—prevents a majority of the citizens from voting, and thereby violates the provisions of the United States Constitution. That a majority of the citizens of these states do not vote in federal elections, no one can deny; Senators and Representatives are sometimes elected with only five or ten percent of the adult population represented at the ballot box. That the poll tax is an obstacle to voting, goes without saying; the accumulated delinquency in some states can amount to about $50, which is a fortune to the poorer residents of the South, white or black. Whether these two facts can be put together into an argument that will cause Congress to unseat more than 10 percent of its total membership, we do not know. We do know, however, that the activity of the Southern Electoral Reform League serves a useful purpose in bringing to public attention what is perhaps the worst single blot on the democratic process in this country.

Harry Bridges

It is most unfortunate that the celebrated case of Harry Bridges was ever allowed to get as far as the Supreme Court of the United States. But there it now rests, at a time when Bridges' home city of San Francisco is on world display as host to the United Nations. The dubious character of the evidence against Bridges, the weak-kneed conduct of the Attorney General's office in the case, the outstanding war contribution Bridges has made and the special historic quality of the time in which his case came to final trial—all were arguments for disposing of the case by executive action before the Supreme Court went into it.

Since executive action was not forthcoming, liberals who are jealous of our country's reputation for protecting civil rights can be thankful for the kind of Court Mr. Roosevelt has built. There is, of course, no indication yet as to the way in which the Justices will vote on the Bridges case, but the questions that have been asked of the Solicitor General and of Bridges' counsel show the kind of alert concern for basic democratic rights that is vastly reassuring. The decision in this case will answer the legal questions whether the Bill

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of Rights extends to protection of aliens in deportation proceedings and whether those proceedings must follow "due process of law." It will also decide the deep moral question whether the United States is entitled to the worldwide admiration it now enjoys as a guarantor of individual liberty.

What Next in Germany?

THE VEXED QUESTION of what to do with Germany has already advanced from the stage of academic discussion to the stage where decisions must be made and put into practice. Day by day, hour by hour, the advance of Allied troops and the acts of the Military Government are preparing the ground for the resumption of German civil life. Lack of clear-cut policies in deciding how this should be done would itself be a policy, and perhaps a fatal one. We can no longer leave Germany to find her own salvation or ruin; we are there, we are in command, we have the responsibility and the power until such time as we decide to relinquish it.

Since the first objective of the whole war is to destroy the Nazi regime, it may be well to assess the plans of that regime to survive. Inhuman and emotionally abnormal as is the Nazi mind, it has never lacked cunning and has never been without cool and calculated plans. On the surface, it would now appear that Hitler and his followers are bent on nothing except mad suicide for themselves, their people and their country. Though they know the war is lost, they continue to fight with fury. Instead of adopting a conciliatory attitude, they do everything to enrage their conquerors by continuing their vile atrocities to the end. Though Germany is faced with hunger, they sabotage the new harvest by destruction of seeds and the utmost efforts to keep manpower from the land. They ruin such transportation facilities as may otherwise fall into our hands. Wherever possible, they refuse to allow Germans to surrender in order to save what is left of their cities and industries. The utmost devastation is their policy. They are acting as the most efficient allies of those who wish to wipe out Germany as Rome wiped out Carthage. This may be a self-imposed Götterdämmerung, a mystic embrace of death. We strongly suspect, however, that it is a shrewd and carefully laid plan to come back to power at some future time.

How could such a plan be expected to work? First of all, the Nazi leaders maintain their prestige by refusing to accept the onus of surrender. They will never admit defeat, but go down with their flags flying. Surrender would lead not merely to their trial and punishment, but to the deflation of their magic over the people. It is obvious that the movement intends to go underground. It was underground in its early career, and it has observed the strength of underground resistance movements in the countries which German arms conquered. The German leaders have learned by experience that no military occupation, no matter how efficient and severe it may be, can root out a resistance movement which has the support of large numbers of the people. The Nazis expect to become the German resistance movement. They expect to keep such popular support as they have, and to win more, by prodding the Allies to be as harsh as possible on the one hand, and by bringing such material hardships upon the German people, on the other, that the Allies, even if they tried, could not greatly alleviate them. The rulers of a nation always are blamed for the miseries of its people. If the rulers are foreign conquerors, the blame is extremely bitter and lasting. The Nazis expect to prevent any rule but their own, except the rule of the victors. When the Allies withdraw their forces, as they must in due course, or when, as the Nazis expect, the Allies fall to quarreling among themselves, the chance for a Fourth Reich will emerge. And the Nazis will be ready to step into the vacancy.

Whether or not this is the scheme of the Nazi leaders, the objective possibility remains that the course of events will bring this sort of result. The most sweeping possible victory will not make Germany a vacuum. We shall not exterminate 80 million people. Nor can we govern them without German aid. Even at the beginning we have to appoint German mayors, reconstitute German local government. We have to do something about starting up industry and agriculture. We can neither feed the Germans nor can we, so long as we are responsible, let them starve. It follows with ineluctable logic that the only way to prevent an ultimate revival of the Nazi regime, or of another as dangerous, is not merely to do our utmost to wipe out the individuals responsible for it, but to prepare the way for a German government which will not only be inclined to be a good neighbor but can win and keep the loyalty of the German people by restoring the means of life and the German community.

This is a puzzling and difficult task. It will not be easy to find enough dependable anti-Nazis capable of reorganizing German life, with what help we can give and shall want to give. Nor will it be easy to prevent those whom we choose from being murdered or discredited by the remnants of the Nazi underground. But one thing is certain. The task will be impossible if we begin by assuming—contrary to the evidence of Germans kept in concentration camps and of the anti-Nazi youth movements which are coming to light—that all Germans are alike, that they are all barbarous and incapable of redemption. It will be impossible if we begin by assuming that in order to rob Germany of the future power to make war we must prevent that resumption of German production necessary to provide a livelihood for the German workers. It will be diffi-

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cult if we begin by demanding of Germany the kind of reparations or imposing on her the kind of dismemberment that will make it impossible for the people to live or for any German government willing to be friendly with us to retain their support.

The recent statement in *Pravda* by George Alexandrov, propaganda chief of the Russian Communist Party, indicates that the Russians are alive to the danger of opinions like the blanket condemnation of Germans expressed by Ilya Ehrenburg. The government, he says emphatically, has never failed to distinguish between the Nazi regime and the German people, nor does it wish to exterminate the German people. Russia needs and will demand German help in her own vast reconstruction.

Russia is as firmly convinced as the other Allies that the Germans must know that they have lost the war. They can hardly fail to know it even now, and certainly will taste the bitter cup of defeat to its dregs in the hardships that must soon follow. But is it not also necessary that the Germans should know they may have hope by following a different policy and a different type of leadership? In addition to destroying the German General Staff and the Nazi regime, in addition to demanding reparations and keeping Germany disarmed, and in addition to remaining strong and united themselves, must not the Allies seek out the remaining sources of democracy and humanity in the German people and begin to help them to lead their nation back into a peaceful and progressive world?

We cannot give the Germans any food or locomotives or ships needed and available to keep the liberated countries from starving. In all relief and reconstruction they must be at the bottom of the priority list. But they must be on the list. In the meantime we should encourage the Germans to help themselves in any way that will not interfere with the recovery of those whom the Germans have ruined. It is not too early to discriminate between those Germans who wish to destroy and those who wish to create; it is not too early to plant the seed of hope. If we are not careful, we may delay until it is too late.

The Salaries of Congressmen

THE National Planning Association's recent recommendation that salaries of congressmen be raised from the present $10,000 a year to $25,000, makes sense. Salaries paid elected state and federal servants were set low by our property-minded founding fathers, and kept low by their property-minded successors, so that none but a citizen with ample private means could afford to hold high public office. Their idea was that government officials elected from the upper financial level would naturally be sympathetic to the interests of their class, and if some upstart should happen to attain office he could be brought to heel through needed financial assistance.

A survey of the salaries paid high state and federal officials bears this out. In 29 of our 48 states, Governors receive less than $8,000 a year, and one, in South Dakota, receives only $3,000. A Senator from New York State, for example, receives $15,000 a year less than a County Court Judge in New York City, $15,000 less than New York City's Superintendent of Schools, $15,000 less than Mayor LaGuardia, $8,000 less than a New York City Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, $5,000 less than the County Clerk of Bronx or Manhattan County and $2,000 less than a judge of the Domestic Relations Court.

These figures are not quoted in order to imply that New York pays excessive salaries. They are quoted to emphasize, by comparison, how ridiculous the salaries are that we pay the men and women who represent us federally. With his $10,000 a year (minus income taxes), a congressman must support two residences, one in expensive Washington and the other in his home state, run for reëlection—every two years if a Representative and every six if a Senator—and reach deep into a thinly lined pocket (unless he has a private income) for campaign expenses, make donations to all kinds of causes and maintain a certain social position. These necessities stretch $10,000 a year pretty thin.

On the other hand, if a congressman received pay to match the importance of his job, more able men would be running for Congress, the attractiveness of corruption would be lessened, and the bond, woven by campaign funds, between our lawmakers and special interests would be weakened—in short, there would be more efficiency in Congress. If we paid our congressmen a decent salary it would only load $6,525,000 more on the taxpayers, an important sum, but not too important in the face of an $80 billion federal budget for the fiscal year of 1946. Considering a congressman's obligation, then, $25,000 a year these days would not seem to pass his point of need.

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Editors: BRUCE BLIVEN, GEORGE SOULE, MICHAEL STRAIGHT, STARK YOUNG

Treasurer: DANIEL MEBANE

Assistant Editors: HEINZ EULAU, ELIZABETH HULING, GEORGE MAYBERRY, HELEN FULLER (Washington)

Contributing Editors: H. N. BRAILSFORD, MALCOLM COWLEY, JULIAN HUXLEY, ALFRED KAZIN, MAX LERNER, E. C. LINDEMAN, THOMAS SANCTON, REXFORD GUY TUGWELL

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Harry S. Truman

THE PEOPLE of the United States thought they knew Calvin Coolidge when he entered the White House upon the death of President Harding in 1923. They did not, nor did they ever become acquainted with him. The man who was elected Vice President in 1920 was the synthetic by-product of newspaper misreporting of a Boston police strike. The President who furnished a name to "Coolidge prosperity," and left a legacy of panic and depression to Herbert Hoover, was a conversationally talkative New Englander with the shrewdness to let official reticence, a friendly press and a soaring stock market cloak his shortcomings. His pseudonym of "Silent Cal" became a synonym for wisdom.

The American people do not know President Harry S. Truman. To an even greater extent, they think they do not know him. That is another way of saying that the means of knowing him have been in their hands, but they have not realized it. Almost any newspaper correspondent in Washington will say in retrospect, I believe, that aside from President Roosevelt, Senator Truman has contributed more than any other civilian to the winning of the war. Yet so completely has he been dissociated from his own work, in the public mind, that even the words "Truman Committee" do not carry the visible imprint of the personality and character of its chairman.

There are several reasons for this. Chief among them is the concentration of attention upon the world military struggle and the handful of supreme commanders guiding it. The same blinding spotlight which beats upon President Truman today obscured him (as it did others) when he was outside its direct rays. Second is the modesty with which Senator Truman conducted his work as chief critic and corrector of errors in the national war effort—no press agents, no drumbeating, no publicity-grabbing interviews, no Dies-like personification and glorification of the Truman Committee in the figure of its chairman. The interacting of these two factors magnified the effect of each.

In addition, and not to be underrated, is the fact that although Senator Truman was for three years the sharpest and most effective critic of the faults of the American war administration, his criticisms were useless to the "hate-Roosevelt" brigade. They consisted, typically, of quiet but pitiless exposure of the delays and losses caused by contractors who placed private profit above the winning of the war; the ineptness of war-production officials who came to government service wrapped in the sacred cowhides of big business; the paralyzing effect of "business-as-usual" pressures on government when the life of the nation was at stake. Such exposures and criticisms could not be taken up by the Republican Party, or by anti-Administration Democrats in Congress, or by the press or the National Association of Manufacturers, without damning the very people they most desired to protect—in the case of the NAM, its own members. But because the American people wanted an effective war machine, and because President Roosevelt and Congress wanted it, the work of Senator Truman and his associates brought effective results. Unquestionably, it has saved billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of American lives.

My acquaintance with the thirty-second President of the United States began in the spring of 1933, when as editor of the St. Louis *Star-Times*, I took part in a conference on better state and county government sponsored by the University of Missouri. Thirty or forty public officials, university professors, social workers and a number of out-of-state experts on governmental problems held a round-table discussion at Columbia. Every subject of debate tended sooner or later to center in the views of a quiet-spoken man who sat across the table from me. He was the only Missouri official in the gathering who could discuss administrative problems on an equality with the visiting experts. When he differed with them, it was on grounds furnished by experience. His desire for good government, and readiness to indorse measures to ensure it, were evident at every stage of the meeting. It was with surprise amounting almost to incredulity that I observed this trend of affairs, for the quiet man whose opinions won so much respect in a gathering of reformers was the presiding judge of the county court (Board of Supervisors in most states) of Jackson County, Missouri, home bailiwick of the notorious Pendergast machine.

When Harry S. Truman was elected to the United States Senate in 1934 with the active support of Tom Pendergast, I shared the general belief in Missouri that he would take orders on legislation from the Kansas City boss—something which in fact he did not do. But it was no surprise to me that in a campaign directed against him as a Pendergast candidate, his record as county judge proved completely immune to criticism. The Kansas City boss, in his overlordship of Kansas City's city-manager government and his control of the state administration, furnished plenty of evidence that he was in politics for something besides his health. His system, however, jumped the county level of government administered by Truman. Why it did so, when a $10-million road-building program in the suburbs of Kansas City was one of the visible prizes, has never been explained.

In more recent years, Senator Truman has said that Pendergast never asked him to do a dishonest thing.

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No doubt that is true. The most likely explanation is that the Kansas City boss knew it would do no good to ask it, and, having things entirely to his liking in other divisions of government, saw no need to take this one out of the hands of an honest man.

Harry Truman's election to the Senate was due to several factors, among which the support of the Pendergast organization ranks first, but this reflected Pendergast's dilemma as much as it did his choice. In 1932, with Republican Senator Patterson of Kansas City a holdover, Pendergast backed one of his Kansas City henchmen to run for the seat vacated by Democratic Senator Hawes of St. Louis. Bennett Champ Clark of St. Louis defeated the Pendergast candidate, largely on the argument that Kansas City should not have two Senators, but also because Tom's protégé had too much of the boss's dust on his coat.

In 1934, with Senator Patterson's defeat a foregone conclusion, Representative John J. Cochran of St. Louis, pro-Roosevelt and pro-labor, entered the Democratic race. His election would have given St. Louis two Senators and exposed Senator Clark to probable defeat on that issue in 1938. The Senator, therefore, sponsored the rural candidacy of Representative "Tuck" Milligan, who had a pro-New Deal voting record but little inherent strength. Pendergast's control of the state did not extend to the St. Louis Democratic organization, and he wanted a friendly Senator from his end of the state. He attempted to find a man inside his city or state machine, with a statewide reputation which would be a protection against the misfortunes of his 1932 candidate. Failing, according to reports then current, in two overtures, he brought out County Judge Truman as a candidate who, in place of a vulnerable statewide reputation, had an unassailable one at home—plus fitness and other assets, such as American Legion, Masonic, Shriner and church connections.

Truman's campaign was a masterpiece of political strategy. He postponed his formal entrance until the two other candidates had seriously weakened each other, one by declaiming against St. Louis having two Senators, the other by protesting against Clark having two votes. When Truman did at length open his campaign, the other candidates turned their guns on him as the Pendergast entry. He virtually knocked that issue out of the campaign, as far as its effectiveness was concerned, with one sentence reported as follows in the hostile St. Louis *Post-Dispatch:*

" 'It will be remembered,' Truman continued with a smile, 'that both Mr. Milligan and Mr. Cochran journeyed to Kansas City two years ago and sought and received the indorsement of the Kansas City organization for their races for nomination as congressmen-at-large from Missouri.' "

Pendergast, in addition to being a Kansas City boss, was hardly less powerful in the state. Democratic candidates for statewide office consisted of those who sought and received, and those who sought and failed to receive, his blessing. Up to 1938, anti-Pendergast candidates became so by necessity, not by choice.

In the quotation given above, the most significant words are "continued with a smile." Harry Truman's personal nature and political acumen are both reflected in them. On the floor of the United States Senate he has been a hard, tough fighter, tangling with his closest Democratic friends as readily as with partisan opponents, and greeting both with the heartiest friendship in the cloakroom a few minutes later. That combination of toughness and good will, together with a general down-to-earth quality, loyalty to party, loyalty to friends without sacrifice of convictions, furnishes the key to his popularity with congressmen of both parties and every political inclination.

The determining factors in the new President's early life show one common trait. Virtually all have a negative characteristic, leading (like the alkaline ash of a burned acid) to positive effects.

He could not go to college because of lack of money —but became a self-taught student of history and economics.

He was refused admission to West Point because of weak eyes—and came out of the First World War a major of artillery.

He took a job, after high-school graduation, as timekeeper for a railroad construction gang—and started a line of thinking which brought him the powerful support of the railroad brotherhoods in his senatorial campaigns.

He became a bank clerk, which is one of the best means of becoming choosey about bankers.

He spent eleven years on his grandmother's 600-acre farm because somebody had to help his father run it—and built the physical stamina on which he relies today.

He went into politics because of the failure of a haberdashery shop which he and a First World War sergeant, Eddie Jacobson, opened after the war.

He spent 14 years paying off the $20,000 worth of haberdashery debts, and—a touch of Horatio Alger here—became President because he neither dodged them by resort to bankruptcy nor took the easy method —easy for anybody holding high public office in Kansas City—of paying them from sources other than his salary.

During Senator Truman's entire first term, he was to Missourians a man of unknown ability (that is, of presumed indifferent ability) who was expected to vote for New Deal measures as long as Tom Pendergast felt that way about the Roosevelt Administration. This was actually the continuance of a preconception. It remained unchanged principally because Senator Bennett Champ Clark—brilliant, erratic, pugnacious and lov-

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able, with political and economic ideas brought down from the presidency of Andrew Jackson—absorbed all the public attention and newspaper publicity that touched the Missouri orbit. He also got all the Missouri patronage, as a soporific for his growing anti-New Dealism.

When Senator Truman finally did receive some publicity, it was nothing to save for his grandchildren's scrapbook. He opposed the reappointment (though not the confirmation) of District Attorney Maurice Milligan of Kansas City (brother of "Tuck"), during his 1937-38 prosecution of the Pendergast machine for election frauds. Although he charged Milligan with exempting Republican election officials from prosecution to win the support of Republican federal judges, Senator Truman's basic position seemed to be that the office of district attorney in western Missouri was his patronage, Milligan was Senator Clark's appointee, the only reason for reappointment was to let him retain charge of the Pendergast prosecutions, and he was not going to turn against Pendergast in his days of adversity after receiving support from him in his days of power. That may or may not be sound moral reasoning, but, with the Pendergast machine under statewide attack by Governor Lloyd Stark and prosecution by Milligan, Truman had more to gain by breaking with Pendergast (as Stark did) than by sticking to him.

I had been two years in Washington when Stark, Maurice Milligan and Truman opened their three-man race for the Democratic senatorial nomination in 1940. Governor Stark, I knew from conversations with him, was a pro-Roosevelt conservative who shared every jittery fear of anti-labor business men, but he was generally regarded as a fighting liberal because he had smashed Pendergast's power. Senator Truman was still virtually unknown in Missouri. No attention was paid to the string of important reports made in 1940 by the Wheeler-Truman subcommittee investigating the Van Sweringen pyramid and costly railroad receiverships.

Truman's continued support of New Deal measures brought only the epithet "rubber stamp," at a time when that stamp had long since lost its inkpad, reactionary Senate Democrats were on a rampage and there was no political machine in Missouri to tell anybody what to do. When I undertook to persuade one of the St. Louis newspapers that Senator Truman was a man of ability, greatly underrated at home, the answer was that he had opposed Milligan's reappointment, therefore theorem. The Senator squeezed through by 8,000 votes because of the bitter hostility of Stark and Milligan toward each other, the Governor's unpopularity in county courthouses and organized labor's support of Truman. Always liked by the Railroad Brotherhoods and the AFL, his voting record had won him the good will of the newly organized CIO, 40,000 strong in St. Louis.

Senator Truman made, and, nationally, was made by, the Truman Committee. Its work will be discussed in a second article, dealing with the new President's views on public questions. Here it is relevant for the light thrown upon his methods of working and his senatorial relationships.

When President Truman said at his first press conference that he would not go to the San Francisco United Nations Conference, that he had a competent delegation and would back them up, he was following the exact formula used by him as chairman of the committee investigating national defense: Organize, delegate the jobs, back up those who do the work.

His practice was to appoint a subcommittee chairman who seemed best fitted to handle a special subject. Then he would name a Democratic and a Republican associate (or let the subcommittee chairman pick them), give them a totally free hand to do their work, and back them to the hilt against outside pressures or reluctant witnesses. Before any of this took place, the committee investigators usually had the evidence so fully in hand that the hearing was a dress performance, to record what was already known.

When hearings, findings and recommendations came before the full committee, Chairman Truman was always the last to state his position. He kept partisan politics out, showed every consideration to the Republican minority and won their complete coöperation.

Few people know how far-reaching the results of this have been. Three of the B2H2 quartet of Senators —Republicans Ball and Burton and Democrat Hatch— were members of the Truman Committee. It was here that bipartisan support of President Roosevelt's international peace policies first came into being, not in the mere drafting of a resolution which helped to galvanize public and senatorial opinion, but in the thinking together which had to precede any form of common action by Democrats and Republicans. The harmony established within the committee led to B2H2, then to a broader united grouping of Democrats and Republicans, and, finally, to a harmonious relationship with the Foreign Relations Committee. This is credited to Mr. Truman by those who were associated in the endeavor.

President Truman believes in teamwork. In politics, he does not challenge men or institutions. He took the Senate as he found it, he will take Congress as he finds it, just as he took the machine in Kansas City, without inquiring whether it is good or bad. He will work with all kinds of men to reach an objective. He will compromise as to the means and manner of reaching it. If the obstacles seem insuperable, he may surrender an objective entirely, but he will not surrender a principle for the sake of an illusory appearance of success.

IRVING BRANT

This is the first of two articles on President Truman. The second will appear next week. —THE EDITORS

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Dry Pogrom in Italy

In Italian, "to control" means "to watch over." In English it means "to manage, to govern, to be the master of the ship." Thus when our Allied Control Commission was spoken of in Italy, the Italians thought that it would "supervise" their government, while Anglo-Americans meant that it should "manage" their government.

The Allied Control Commission (ACC), which even after it was termed Allied Commission (AC), was "controlling" (in the English sense) Italian affairs will, thank Heaven, no longer "control" them.

From the official communiqué of February 25 listing the things the Italian government would be allowed to do from then on, one can infer the things the same government had not been allowed to do before. According to that communiqué, Harry MacMillan, British Resident Minister of the Central Mediterranean, informed the Italian government

> that it should conduct its relations with other governments no longer indirectly through the AC, but directly. They have an absolutely free right to appoint and receive ambassadors to and from all Allied and neutral countries. They will deal directly with their Ambassadors in foreign countries and with their own secret channels of communication by diplomatic pouch. Up until now decrees and laws passed by the government had to be approved by the AC. This requirement is abolished. Therefore, the Italian government regains full control over its legislative authority. As regards administration, it has up to now been the practice that all appointments of the Italian government must be approved by the Commission. This requirement also is abolished and all appointments from members of government down to minor functionaries will be the sole responsibility of the Italian government itself.

Thus on February 25, 1945, Italy became "virtually a sovereign state."

The Italians can now hope that it will no longer be possible for the American ambassador to insist that his man of confidence be chosen as Italian ambassador to Washington; and when, to avoid a scandal, someone else is chosen, the American ambassador will not demand that his protégé be appointed as first secretary in the Embassy, ready to act as *chargé d'affaires* when the ambassador is not on duty.

On the other hand, the same official communiqué of February 25 warned us that the "requirements of the Italian campaign and overriding military needs must be protected and the rights of the Allied governments will be held in reserve in the matter of day-to-day administration"; they will be carried on through the British and American ambassadors in Rome, while the Commission's relations with the Italian government "will be merely advisory and consultative."

In short, the Italian government was first blessed with an Allied Control Commission, then it got the Allied Commission, and since February 25 it has enjoyed an Allied Advisory Commission (AAC)—in addition to the American and British embassies. What will happen if the Italian government does not conform to the advice and consultations of the AAC and the two embassies? A mother told her daughter: "From now on you are free, but be careful not to do anything that I do not approve of."

To realize how widely the sovereignty of the Italian state extends, it may suffice to point out that on March 17 "the Land Forces Subcommission of the Allied Control *(sic)* Commission" permitted combat elements of the Italian army serving with the Eighth Army to receive a ration of cognac consisting precisely of 0.338 of a fluid ounce per man. "A spokesman said just how often this ration would be available would depend on the supply, but he thought it might be daily or every other day" (the New York *Times*, March 18, 1945). The Allied (no longer Control) Commission is still acting as Control Commission even in so trifling a matter as supplying combat units with cognac!

Let us not be fooled by words. As long as war is being waged on Italian soil and the responsibility for it is lodged with the Allies, these have to control not only Italian military but also civil administration in its essentials, if not in all its smallest details, as they so unintelligently do. What matters is not whether there is "control" or "advice" or "consultation," but what are the methods and aims of such "control," "advice" or "consultation."

On August 21, 1944, just a few days after Churchill had been in Rome regaling with his protection Bonomi and whoever was willing to bow to it, Lord Halifax sent a memorandum to the United States State Department in which he stated that aid to Italy should be strictly limited to preventing, in the interests of the Allied nations, an utter collapse in the Italian structure that might make impossible the continuation of war. But if the United States Government had wanted to go beyond that line and rehabilitate the economic life of the country, it would have provoked in England a reaction dangerous to the good relations of the two countries. (The document was published on January 6, 1945, by the Italian-language paper, *Il Progresso Italo-Americano*, and there is no doubt about its authenticity.)

A few days later, at the Quebec conference, Drew Pearson, who has proved well informed on what goes on in Washington in connection with Italian affairs, reports that the Italian question was brought up, and Churchill was told that something must be done for the economic recovery of Italy. He burst out: "To the

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devil! We will feed the Italians and nothing more." In the Yalta meeting, Mr. Hopkins reported on the "terrible conditions" of Italy, but Churchill "held fast" in asserting that we must limit ourselves to "alimentary aid" and that we must not help the Italians to "reconstruct their ruined economy at the expense of the British people or of any other Allied nation, until the war has ended." Churchill cannot see that allowing the Italians to do their best to reorganize their economic structure would be useful in Italy to the Allies themselves.

On October 21, 1944, President Roosevelt issued orders to the effect that the bread ration should be increased from 200 to 300 grams a day for all the people in "liberated" Italy. He repeated "unequivocal" orders to the same purpose last December. But these "orders were not obeyed" (the New York *Times*, February 11, 1945). The orders to disobey were given by Churchill.

On March 1, 1945, Roosevelt's promise of bread, made on October 31, 1944, began to be kept, and every "liberated" Italian could eat 300 instead of 200 grams of bread every day, or 200 grams of bread a day and 550 grams of macaroni every week. Even so, the State Department was following the plan of Churchill and Halifax: "Feed the Italians and nothing more," and feed them just as little as possible.

Every time there are complaints about the slowness and insufficiency with which food is being sent to starving Italy, we are told that there are no ships for transportation. *The British Foreign Office and the American State Department know quite well that this statement is not true.*

The Overseas News Agency, on February 19, published an interview with the Undersecretary of the Merchant Marine at Rome, from which we learned that 271,000 tons of vessels had been requisitioned by the Allies for their needs, but 15,000 tons of bottoms that could immediately be put into use were still lying idle, not requisitioned, in Italian ports. In addition, there were in Latin American ports many ships sold by the Italian Fascist government to Argentina and Brazil, of which possession might easily be regained. There was one Italian ship of 8,000 tons in a port of the Irish Free State, and there were others lying idle in ports of the United States. The crews were available, but were kept idle. The Italian government could not regain possession of these ships if it did not get the assurance that *they would not be requisitioned by the victors as soon as they were released* (according to conditions imposed by the September 29, 1943, armistice). The Italian government had requested that provisions be made for the solution of this problem. It had received no answer. In addition, some of the ships requisitioned by the victors could be used as transports, since the military situation in the Mediterranean was no longer what it was in 1943; the small craft taken at the time of the Anzio landings were no longer essential to military operations. Finally, disabled and overage craft might be repaired and new ones could be constructed with the material at hand. But no one dared to do anything for fear that the victors would take possession of the ships the minute they had been repaired or constructed. Recently it was proposed that a line be opened between northern Sardinia and the mainland by means of small craft easily obtainable. The answer of the Allied Commission was that it would investigate.

In September, 1944, the announcement was made from the Quebec Conference that UNRRA would be allowed to spend in Italy $50 million to help non-Italian refugees and Italian children and pregnant women. On March 10, 1945—five months later—an official communiqué announced that UNRRA *would* provide for care and assistance of children and nursing and expectant mothers, for supply of medicines and medical equipment, for help to non-Italian refugees in Italy and for the control of epidemics. A total of 2,000 tons of relief supplies *were ready* for distribution. Another 2,000 tons *were being unloaded* in an Italian port and other supplies *were on the way. It was hoped* an average of 15,000 tons of shipping every month *would be available* for bringing relief. On the same day the Director General of UNRRA in Washington stated that soon 25 tons of materials *would be sent*. Four centers *had been established*, where 2,000 refugees, mostly Yugoslavs and Poles, were helped. Investigations *were being made* about the needs of the different liberated areas. Five months after the much heralded Quebec decisions almost all these verbs were in the future tense and investigations were still to be made. The only initiative that really existed—in actual facts and not in the future tense—was the help given the 2,000 *non-Italian* refugees.

On the same day, March 10, another piece of good news was published in the New York *Herald Tribune* (my italics):

> A special medical mission *will* depart soon for Italy to control and prevent infectious diseases stemming from that nation's food difficulties. The journey of the medical men has been planned for several months under stress of the spread of tuberculosis and dysentery in Italy, diseases believed closely associated with malnutrition. We don't know what the situation is, and it is rather difficult to say until we get there. Last fall the official Italian ration was only 1,000 calories a day, half of the subsistence minimum, and still less in some sections. Children had been the principal sufferers, with tuberculosis and undernourishment spreading.

The present writer does not need to go to Italy to guess the consequences of malnutrition. Instead of sending experts to study the consequences of malnutrition, it would be better to send more food to Italian children, who should not be made guinea pigs for experts.

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As long as British policy is aimed at preventing the economic, political and moral recovery of Italy, and as long as American action is riveted to the British, realities will remain unchanged, even if words change. When they announced that the Italian government would become "virtually sovereign," London and Washington had one aim only: to throw upon the shoulders of Italian central and local authorities the whole burden and responsibility for conditions that had been created in the country by misguided Allied policies. The Italian government was given uniforms and small arms to equip police and regular soldiers, not for war against the Germans but for repression of the Italians. When Italians have to be shot, this job must be done by other Italians and not by Allied soldiers. On October 19, 1944, in Palermo, 29 persons were killed and 155 wounded by the Royal Army equipped with American uniforms, guns and bombs. Almost every day people are killed in "liberated" Italy by guns and bombs coming from America. Since Italians are killing Italians, the scandal of Athens, where British soldiers killed Greeks, does not occur in Italy. After all, Italians are entitled to kill Italians. It is America's business to provide them with arms. It is not America's business to prevent them from using their arms. The Allies' only business is to "hold in reserve their rights in the matter of day-to-day administration."

GAETANO SALVEMINI

Human Rights: Bill or Agency?

THE PROTECTION of human rights is a task that bulks large among those confronting the San Francisco Conference. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals confine it, in Chapter IX, to the secondary functions of an advisory Economic and Social Council. Those who still hold "that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men," would like to see it included in Chapter III among the essential aims of the international organization. So would those who know that individual freedom and international peace are indivisible. But the question is not what the United Nations Charter will say about human rights, and even less in which chapter it will say it. The critical question is whether anything at all can be done about it.

General agreement on the essentials of human rights seems to exist among the United Nations. Whether or not all of them are equally sincere about it is doubtful. Hardly any of them would refuse to join in a general statement of respect for fundamental freedoms, but it would be very difficult to formulate detailed provisions dealing with human rights which would prove acceptable to everybody at this time.

It is also the consensus that the international community has some interest in the preservation of certain minimum standards of individual freedom. But attempts at an outright international enforcement of these standards would be blocked by reluctance to recognize a superior international power in a sphere long a jealously guarded domain of internal jurisdiction.

If this appraisal is correct, the way, if any, of assuring some concrete protection of human rights at this time must be found in a scheme that would make use of the general, although vague, agreement on the existence of some basic human rights and their international significance, but at the same time avoid the difficulty of a detailed definition of such rights and thus sidetrack the opposition to superior international enforcement which deems it a challenge to national sovereignty.

This dilemma can be solved through (1) the avoidance of every attempt at the formulation of a detailed Bill of Rights at this time, and (2) the immediate creation of an international agency that will operate within the framework of the national sovereignties. Such an agency should, in the first instance, use whatever machinery, legal or otherwise, is provided for by the several nations in order to further and protect the basic human rights already recognized by their internal laws.

The creation of the agency should not be contingent upon the promulgation of a detailed Bill of Rights. The San Francisco Conference obviously would be unable to formulate it. Every attempt to force such an action would result in a reference to a special committee with the consequent postponement of all action in the field of human rights. On the other hand, the fundamental rules of an International Bill of Rights are already on the law books of the various countries. Thus, for instance, Rumania has never repealed the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the enjoyment "without discrimination as regards racial origin, language or religion" of "liberty of conscience, freedom of instruction, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association." The Spanish Constitution still assures that "any individual has the right freely to express his ideas and opinions, availing himself of any method of dissemination without being subject to prior censorship"; and Argentina goes beyond the classical freedoms in adding the freedom "to teach and to study" and in proclaiming as a matter of constitutional law that "the national jails shall be healthful and clean, intended for the safekeeping and not for the punishment of the offenders detained therein."

It is, of course, true that most of these solemn proclamations have been honored more in the breach than in the observance. But the mere adoption of an international Bill of Rights would not change the situation. The main effort must be made in the direc-

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tion of international *enforcement* rather than promulgation of additional *substantive rules*.

The first function of the agency should be the study of the conditions prevailing in the various countries in respect to the protection of human rights. Such studies, based on reports of the governments concerned and field observations made by representatives of the agency, should be made available to the general public.

In the second place, the agency should have the right to appear before legislatures, administrative agencies and national courts as *amicus curiae* whenever it feels that the cases or problems before these bodies are of concern to the international community at large.

Third, the agency should be granted the right of independent petition. Most people in areas of impairment of civil liberties do not know how to ask for their rights. To ensure the effective protection of the inarticulate, the agency should have the right of initiative, independent of the complaint of interested private parties. And to remedy possible inhibitions of local attorneys in critical areas, the various member nations should, on reciprocal terms, grant to the members of the bar of a sister nation the right to represent the agency before their courts.

Finally, the agency should attempt the application of the technique of "yardstick regulation" in the field of civil liberties. The agency should organize an Office of Peace Information and, complying with local regulations, should approach the peoples of the various countries through the channels of the press, radio and film. The publication of a newspaper or the furnishing of news facilities would give the agency more firsthand data on the actual scope of freedom in a country than volumes of investigation. And the presence of a free news periodical could do more to free the spirit of a country than scores of injunctions.

In none of these activities will the agency act as a superior international power, but appear before the various branches of a national government as a witness, a petitioner or a corporation. It will operate from within the framework of an unimpaired national sovereignty. The only privileges and immunities the agency should claim are those customarily granted by all sovereigns to the agents of their sister nations.

These privileges should include the recognition of the agency's juristic personality; the diplomatic immunity of its agents; their right to free travel; and the extraterritoriality of premises. The extension of such privileges to international bodies has already a number of precedents. For example, the constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization provides for the grant "of all the immunities and facilities which each member nation accords to diplomatic missions, including inviolability of premises, immunity from suit and exemption from taxation." The signatories of this constitution thought that further extension of privileges to international organizations was not unlikely, and introduced, as an alternative means of determining the privilege of employees of the Food Organization, the reference to the "immunities and facilities which may thereafter be accorded to equivalent members of the staffs of other public international organizations."

The human-rights agency should be an independent functional agency. Modern experience has shown the great advantages of independent regulatory agencies on the domestic plane. Chapter IX of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provides—in Section A (2) and in Section D (1), respectively—for the two distinct types of international bodies, the specialized agencies independent in nature and the commissions of experts, being part of the Economic and Social Council. Whether or not an expert study and research group on human rights is created, it is important that the main task of protection of individual freedom be entrusted to a functional, active, independent agency detached from power politics and having a much greater capacity for flexible local action than the Council or its committees are likely to possess.

The human-rights agency should not only decentralize its activities as much as possible, but also attempt close coöperation with responsible unofficial national organizations. A number of associations intent upon promoting civil-liberties standards could coöperate with local branches of the agency and act, in some countries, as the first stage in sifting the multitude of complaints.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide that all specialized agencies shall be brought into relationship with the general international organization. The human-rights agency would thus be called upon to make reports and recommendations to the Assembly, its Councils and Commissions. It should also be empowered, when necessary, to bring suit for declaratory or remedial judgment in the Permanent Court of International Justice.

It is, of course, far from certain that all the governments concerned will be ready to accept even this minimum program for international action. In fact, it is possible that some of them will refuse to consent to the creation of an international agency at this time, while claiming their readiness to enter into thorough—and lengthy—negotiations aimed at the formulation of a code of substantive international law. But it seems likely that no nation prepared for bona-fide recognition of the international interest in human rights will reject a program which calls for no more than an agency operating primarily, if not exclusively, on the basis of that nation's own laws and before that nation's own tribunals.

Neither should it be assumed that, once created, the agency will achieve the millennium. It must be recalled, however, that the usual pattern of a dictator's career shows, at the beginning, a decided reluctance to break international ties or to defy public opinion abroad. Even after the fury of a war, civil or otherwise, has swept a country, some humanitarian devices

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have been known to afford a minimum of protection.

The present proposal, far from being new, is nothing else than an application of basic lessons of the history of freedom to the field of international law. These lessons point to the overwhelming importance of procedural institutions over substantive rights. The humanization of English law has not been the work of a council charged with the formulation of the code of equity: it has been the result of a procedural device, the creation of a Court of Chancery. The recent growth of administrative agencies is but a manifestation of the same institutional trend. The United States Federal Trade Commission Act, for instance, does not contain any more precise mandate than the outlawing of "unfair" methods of competition, but this has not prevented the Commission from evolving a consistent and important body of trade regulations. It would be easy to multiply instances of statutes successfully entrusting important and delicate functions to administrative agencies with the help solely of criteria such as "fair, equitable and feasible," or consistent with "public convenience and necessity." And it should not be forgotten that in the United States the least specific of constitutional provisions, the "due-process" clause, proved to be a great safeguard of individual liberties.

The time seems ripe for a reception of similar, common-law techniques in international law and politics. The recent recourse to the creation of specialized agencies is an instance of this new spirit. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are another. The Proposals do not attempt to formulate a body of international public law prior to the creation of the security organization. The same approach must be followed for the protection of human rights.

Progressive public opinion must demand the immediate creation of an international functional agency entrusted with a case-by-case evolution of an international law rooted in the principles already embodied in the various national legal orders. The Scylla of perfectionism that would delay the creation of an agency till a Bill of Rights is accepted and its supremacy recognized by all nations, and the Charybdis of defeatism that would be satisfied with the mere insertion of a formula bare of institutional backing, must be avoided. The United Nations must not let the creative moments of international coöperation go by without building a functional agency whose very existence will be a recognition of the basic liberties of man. ALEXANDER H. PEKELIS

Russia's Plans for Germany

The following article was written before Mr. George Alexandrov, chief of the propaganda section of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, in a sensational article in Pravda *of April 14, 1945, declared that Ilya Ehrenburg, the well known journalist, "does not express Soviet public opinion" on the German question. Ehrenburg's thesis of the collective guilt of the German people, Mr. Alexandrov wrote, "is not well thought out and is visibly erroneous. . . . The Soviet people have never considered as one and the same the German population and the criminal Nazi clique ruling Germany. . . . The unfounded conclusions and deductions of Comrade Ehrenburg confuse the question and, of course, do not help to expose the provocative politics of the Hitlerites directed toward dissension among the Allies. . . . The Soviet government never had and does not have as its aim the extermination of the German people."* – THE EDITORS

NOW THAT VICTORY is quite certain, one problem agitating the Soviet public is what to do with Germany and the Germans. Events show that the Soviet government has a detailed plan for dealing with Germany. This plan is based upon close knowledge of the Germans, and of their mentality and methods. At its foundation is the premise that Germany must pay for the war, and that Germans guilty of war crimes must pay for their crimes.

During the past six weeks many articles have appeared in the Soviet press dealing with this problem. Every aspect of Germany's future is being taken up. The outlines of the Soviet plan for Germany are slowly becoming delineated.

Possibly the most authoritative and thorough article concerning the economics of the whole problem was written by S. H. Turetsky in the February issue of the *Bolshevik*, published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Turetsky deals with direct war expenditures, which he calculates at more than 40 billion rubles for every 130 to 140 days. By implication and by direct statement, he suggests that Germany ought to be forced to pay for war damages. He says, "Compensation by Germany for damages in accordance with the decisions at the Crimean Conference of the three Allied leaders has a tremendous major meaning: the former economic power of Germany must be destroyed. Her military potential must be liquidated. The national wealth of Germany and the labor of her population will serve as sources of compensation for war damages caused by the fascist aggressors to peace-loving nations."

How does the *Bolshevik* estimate the costs of war? It divides them into four major groupings: (1) direct expenditures in the conduct of the war; (2) losses caused by the war in connection with destruction and robbery of material values; (3) damages caused by the

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partial devastation of the productive forces, the output of which under normal conditions ensures an increase in national wealth; and finally (4) damage derived from the direct but incomplete usage of a portion of the productive capacities of the land, as a consequence of temporary occupation by the enemy of territory, and the blockade.

Since they wish compensation for war damages, how do the Russians estimate their extent? A special government commission has been working for a long time compiling a list of Soviet losses. With great meticulousness a census has been taken in every collective farm, village, town and factory, even in churches, to determine what has been destroyed, damaged or stolen. Standard prices have been set for most items and a bill is unquestionably being prepared.

Turetsky, citing a statement by the former French Aviation Minister, Pierre Cot, estimates the damage done by the Germans in the Soviet Union at approximately $225 billion. "This sum," Turetsky comments, "which is only a portion of the war costs, must be considered as rather underestimated than overestimated."

In dealing with damage caused by devastation of productive capacities to the war output, Turetsky writes, "That kind of losses in the present war has an especially great significance for our country if one is to consider the tremendous and constantly growing development of productive forces and the increase in national wealth in the years of peaceful socialist construction." As to the fourth point, he says, "Damages caused by the general stoppage in the development of the productive forces of the country in the war years considerably exceed military costs." In addition, of course, a considerable portion of the productive capacities of the Soviet Union could not be utilized at all during two or three years, owing to the occupation of the western areas of the country by the enemy.

Quite obviously, the total damage to Russia, not to speak of other Eastern and Western European countries, is so great that the question arises whether or not Germany can ever make compensation or restitution. Most informed Russians believe that during the 13 years of Hitler's rule Germany has found sufficient energy to build an enormous war apparatus and then carry on a ruinous war of unexampled proportions. Of course it is admitted that much of the German war material was created by slave labor—millions of Frenchmen, Poles, Russians and others. This was uncompensated labor, and thus the cost to Germany has been nil, since even the slaves' food was stolen from occupied lands. For this reason Germany should be made to continue the same effort to make restitution as she had made for war.

The commonly held opinion here is that represented, for instance, by Ilya Ehrenburg, who maintains that German manpower should be made available to rebuild portions of Russia and other countries. Complementary is the Soviet demand, expressed, for example, by an article in *Red Star* on March 21, for liquidation of the economic foundations of German militarism. Says *Red Star:* "The economic disarmament of Germany can only be effective if she is not only deprived of the industry which today produces arms, but also of those branches of industry which may be utilized for armaments in case of the appearance of new technical inventions." The article proposes not only the control but the liquidation of this industry in Germany. But it goes even farther and suggests that the experience of disarming Germany after the First World War demonstrates that her economic disarmament will only be effective if Germany is also deprived of all hidden possibilities for reëstablishing her military and economic power. Finally, *Red Star* proposes that the Allies seize German monopolistic wealth, patents, etc., in Argentina, Spain, Switzerland, as well as German secret hoards in these and other countries.

So much for economic plans. The Russians also have their plans for dealing with German militarism *per se*. They propose final and complete destruction of the German General Staff which, they believe, did not stop functioning for one day after the First World War and immediately commenced to prepare for the Second. The Russians are convinced that the Germans are already beginning preparations for a third world war, and they are determined to prevent this. The Russians believe that in order to keep Germany completely disarmed, the unity of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR is essential. One senses here the absolute conviction that any serious breach between the three great Allies will eventually lead to another world disaster.

Second, the Russians propose to destroy the German General Staff, physically and politically. They will propose the arrest, trial and hanging of all leading generals and members of the General Staff responsible for the present war and its effects. They will propose the trial and punishment of all lesser lights. They will propose the confiscation, removal, and if necessary the destruction, of all documentation of the General Staff —all past, present and future plans for war, such as mobilization orders, secret documents, maps and plans for new and yet more terrible weapons. But most important of all, the Russians propose to eliminate the Nazi Party, to arrest and try to hang all Nazi Party, Gestapo and SS leaders, and all who are *directly or indirectly* responsible for murder and terror. Possibly all Soviet plans for Germany are incomplete as yet, but the Russians know what they want. And above all, I am convinced that they want Great Britain, the United States and themselves to apply such plans jointly and decisively.

Moscow RAYMOND ARTHUR DAVIES

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Washington Notes

Mr. Truman's First Week

Most American newspapers fought President Roosevelt while he was alive. His support came from the masses. Now that Roosevelt is dead, many papers have been engaging in a remarkable process of self-hypnosis over President Truman. I do not say this in bitterness. A mood of dedication and nonpartisanship has temporarily settled over the land, which should be respected. (It was particularly notable in the Senate as Connally and Vandenberg made their final speeches before going to San Francisco. It bodes well for the conference and is in part a tribute to Mr. Roosevelt.) But political realities must be faced.

The stock market entered its own interested judgment of Roosevelt's death by bouncing up. It was led by public-utility stocks. Evidently there was a feeling that the White House was "going conservative." Some diminution of this feeling now seems to have set in. Meanwhile, editorial pages which had thundered against Roosevelt living, extolled him dead, but frequently with the reservation that everything, after all, was for the best, and that all these "hordes of strident young radicals" (Frank Kent) would soon depart. Roy Roberts, managing editor of the Kansas City *Star*, in a syndicated column supposed to be based on first-hand Truman information, reassured the faithful. Roosevelt meant well of course. But he was a "patrician." And (paradoxically) a reformer. "*PM*, a left-wing newspaper in New York with small circulation," Mr. Roberts wrote, "the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, were gospels of the New Deal. . . . They were bibles in Washington." Now, under the "average-man" leadership of Mr. Truman, he explained, they won't be read any more and all will be satisfactory, and the country will get back to "normalcy."

Well, Mr. Truman may or may not be a Roosevelt liberal, but I think he is no fool. He is a party man first of all and a political regular, with his feet on the ground. Will he go conservative? Look at the election returns! Two-thirds of Roosevelt's support came from city liberals (whereas about two-thirds of Democratic congressional control is now in the hands of Southern conservatives). Mr. Truman, even if he wanted to, couldn't be reëlected without labor. Most of the conservative papers patting him on the head today will be throwing bricks tomorrow. If the Republicans three years hence nominate a liberal like Stassen, and the CIO-PAC swings over to him, Mr. Truman won't stand a chance of reëlection (and his chances even at best are not too good). These are brutal political truths which somebody might as well state at the start of the new term. I understand the labor leaders and the CIO-PAC group are consciously refraining from the slightest pressure. (As a matter of fact, they are genuinely pleased with Truman). But there the situation is.

There is a fascination about a new administration. There is the terrific struggle for power, for personal advancement. There are the rumors of who has the President's ear and who will be the palace favorite. There are Cinderella human-interest stories, like Truman's telephone call to his old school teacher "Tilly" Brown, in Independence, Missouri (which becomes what Plymouth, Vermont, was to the Coolidge era), to tell her that he has just named Charley Ross, fellow high-school classmate, as press secretary. Washington reporters are sympathetic at first. Mr. Truman, for instance, is given sole credit for Marshal Stalin's decision to substitute Molotov for Ambassador Gromyko as Soviet representative to San Francisco. Actually, one suspects, Stalin was only too eager to have Molotov come to America to give the unknown Truman the once-over. Only later does the press cool, when it comes into inevitable professional conflict with the President, in its ceaseless game of news hide-and-seek. It can fairly be said that, to date, Mr. Truman has created a favorable impression. His appointments have seemed good (Charley Ross's excellent) and he has thrown his full weight behind Bretton Woods, the Hull trade act and Dumbarton Oaks. I didn't like his letter, which the press hardly noticed, to Emma Guffey Miller, of the National Women's Party, indorsing the "equal rights" constitutional amendment. But this was a trickily worded affair and I doubt if Mr. Truman knew the controversy he was getting into.

Notes. – There were a lot of last-minute cancellations to the San Francisco conference by correspondents who decided the Truman story was too big to leave. . . . You can't really grasp what the tariff fight in the House Ways and Means Committee is like unless you have seen it: the 10 GOP Representatives, led by Knutson and Gearhart, have learned nothing, forgotten nothing, still genuflect at mention of Smoot-Hawley, still think of America as living in the McKinley era of agriculture and foreign investments, still, like the nursemaid, have ears attuned only to the squawl of infant industries. . . . Westbrook Pegler returns from vacation to three libel suits: he called Drew Pearson a faker ($50,000); accused Harry Bridges of using union dues for the Communist Party ($600,000); imputed Communist motives to Latex president A. N. Spanel's editorial advertisements for Wallace, and others (two suits: $3,000,000). Pegler never had a libel suit under 11-year, hawk-eyed World-Telegram blue-penciling, now Hearst has the headache. . . . The Senate Agriculture Committee is turning its "meat-shortage" investigation into a flanking movement against the consumer, to get higher prices for packers; Senators who denied enforcement funds criticize the agency now for black markets. . . . The parochial-school issue, I regret to say, threatens the latest effort to write a federal education bill intended to lift school standards in the South. . . . President Truman reads his speeches from triple-spaced paragraphs, bound in a loose-leaf note book; his speech before the joint session of Congress had points marked for emphasis, but Truman lapsed gradually into a monotone, saved the day by his honesty and prayerful sincerity. . . . The War Department has printed an orientation fact sheet, dated March 24, on American fascism, boldly declaring there are "native American fascists" and telling soldiers how they can be spotted —by their appeal to prejudice, intolerance and the trick of calling all opponents "Reds." It is an admirable leaflet, prepared for army study groups.

Washington T. R. B.

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Sweet and Low

"COLONEL BLIMP" is a gentle character study of an English army man named Clive Candy (Roger Livesey) that is based on David Low's much less optimistic cartoons and much less admirable cartoon character. In the cartoons Blimp personifies all that is wrong with the English Tory; as Candy in the movie he can hardly make a mistake, and actions he is criticized for—such as wanting to fight the Nazis as a gentleman—are readily understood by him and corrected, causing no trouble.

The film shows Candy, a hero of the Boer War, going rather unbelievably to Berlin to dispel German propaganda that the English treated Boer prisoners badly. A beerhall brawl leads to a duel with a German officer (Anton Walbrook) and ends with both duelists in a hospital, the best of friends, and the German winning Candy's girl (Deborah Kerr). He hunts big game until the First World War, when he is seen as a Brigadier General, humanely questioning some German prisoners and noticing an English nurse who reminds him of his first love. Between the Armistice and the present war he marries her, hunts more game, administers colonies, and in this war he learns that the Nazis must be fought with cruel methods. The story is told in a very leisurely way, mostly by talk, with little action by camera or people, few decisive moments, and transitional scenes that seem as costly and long as the main events. It is conservative in technique and about life, but it is a charming, warm-hearted, commendable production, filled with good acting and characterization.

Emeric Pressburger and Michael Powell, who made the picture, show the ability to get character unstereotyped, individualized and definite, and they have constructed their scenes so that consistency and naturalness of character seem more important than what is being said, done or about to be done. Candy seems to me the odd result of starting with Low's pompous fool and trying to make him more commendable. Instead of being rigid and stupid, he turns out lovably boyish and chivalrously half-bright; he is incapable of deception, cruelty or anger, and incapable of recognizing them; he misses a great deal of everything, including his friend's love affair with his girl, his own love for her until it is too late, but he remains true to her for the rest of his life; he goes through war as though it were no more complicated and vast than cricket. The character has some of the naïve gallantry of the old movie comedians like Buster Keaton, and he is played by Livesey with a pure goodness and youthfulness from his handsome days to his walrus period. Candy's wary, complicated German friend has some inexplicable switches to make in his friendship, but he is one of those rare movie people whose nobility and motives are blurred. Anton Walbrook, with a soft, calculating stare and voice, does a good job with the part, especially in his worn-out refugee days. There are a number of nicely twitted lesser people, admirable stretches when people carry on in the most quiet, casual manner, endearing moments, such as the tired, unperceiving way Candy goes through an operetta-like First World War. The two notable events of the film are an unusually full, neat satire of ritual-clamped people and of national character in a duel, and a beautiful picture of old age.

The movie doesn't look with enough wholeness or daring at its life to make it a deeply moving or even mildly complicated experience. Its attitude about its hundreds of almost totally upper-class Englishmen is that they are very good people, and by the casting and treatment are receiving the rewards of a good life. It is ingeniously careful not to brag about them, or make them obviously heroic in the manner of Hollywood, and to be amused by stuffiness, funny looks and conservatism. There isn't a sign of discomfort over them, and nothing to indicate that anybody in England is living insecurely, meanly (there is one cruel South African), much less that the English had anything to do with causing their wars. The hero's endless soldiering, hunting and colony administration probably involved a good deal of character that is not accounted for by the movie. The criticism of the Germans seemed to me to be pleasantly pat, unoriginal and carefully fitted to the popular attitude of the moment toward Germans, and there is something unpleasantly finicky in the treatment of the one good German in the film. The technique is no more daring than what we are accustomed to, but both technique and content are worked to a tasteful, engaging point.

MANNY FARBER

A Communication

Birth Control and Civil Liberties

SIR: My article on "The Birth-Control Debate" (December 11) was neither for nor against birth control. It was a plea for more competent discussion on both sides of that controversy. The article on "Catholicism Fights Birth Control" (January 22) by Mr. C. P. Trowbridge, president of the Planned Parenthood Federation, is not on the "other side" of anything I wrote. A reporting of nine instances of Catholic opposition to birth control is about as important as nine instances of WCTU opposition to the liquor business or of Republican opposition to the New Deal. The only significant point in Mr. Trowbridge's article is his wholly indefensible attempt to tie his instances together as *violations of civil liberties*. Not one of them is a violation of civil liberties.

I am not here taking the position that these decisions by Catholics were good or bad from the viewpoints of sociology, theology or the good-neighbor policy, or on any other grounds. I am not discussing the merits of the decisions. The point is civil liberties. Twice recently the *New Republic* has (with accuracy) listed me as a Catholic active in the affairs of the American Civil Liberties Union. Mr. Trowbridge mentioned my name six times in his article, with the result (for anyone sufficiently confused about civil liberties to accept his thesis) of portraying me as one unable to see violations of civil liberties by fellow Catholics. This is grossly unfair because wholly false.

Just what is "pressure," and when good, clean campaigning becomes pressure (other than when the activity of one's opponent is to be characterized), is a bit hard to say. The examples cited by Mr. Trowbridge, however, as reprehensible Catholic pressure in the birth-control controversy, are all simply the most ordinary manifestations of freedom (civil liberties) in a free society. Clearly, Mr. Trowbridge

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either does not understand or does not believe in civil liberties. Maybe that is not a matter of great importance. But when the *New Republic* agrees with Mr. Trowbridge on this subject, that is a matter of great importance. For the *New Republic* not to understand or not to believe in civil liberties is tragic. Your refusal to publish an article of mine, answering Mr. Trowbridge's attack by discussing his instances in, at least, some detail, *on the ground that you did not agree with my position, but did agree with Mr. Trowbridge*, reveals your position. Regardless of your attitude toward the Catholic Church or the Planned Parenthood Federation and its president, if you believe in civil liberties at all, you have to believe in them for those with whom you disagree, on birth control or any other subject.

The position you have taken on this matter not only puts you in agreement with Mr. Trowbridge, but it also puts you in complete opposition to the established position of the American Civil Liberties Union. Mr. Roger Baldwin, the director of the Union, has read the manuscript with which you disagreed and has written me that my position is unassailable from the civil-liberties viewpoint. If you and Mr. Trowbridge are right, the American Civil Liberties Union has been consistently wrong for years.

Catholic clergymen, as in Waterbury, Connecticut, have the same right to demand enforcement of a law dealing with birth control as have other clergymen to demand enforcement of a law dealing with alcoholic beverages. The rights of both will be absolute so long as we have civil liberties. Catholic citizens, clerical or lay, have the same right to argue on one side of a bill before the Massachusetts legislature as have the members of the Planned Parenthood Federation to argue on the other side. The non-Catholics who joined with the Catholics in that debate had, of course, the same rights. Even Protestants do not have to agree with each other where we have civil liberties.

Private Catholic hospitals have the same right to any *legal* regulations in regard to who shall be allowed to practise in them as have other private institutions—universities, libraries, museums—to the legal regulations of their choice. Whether the use of public money by these hospitals is consistent with their regulations is a matter for the state legislature. If civil liberties are to be observed, any resident must be free to try to persuade the legislature either way.

Mr. Trowbridge is most exercised over the fact that in Baltimore Archbishop Curley's sponsorship of the War and Community Fund could be had only on the terms of the Archbishop himself. How eccentric! Who does the Archbishop think he is—a free man in a free country? Probably he thinks that in this country civil liberties apply even to archbishops—as well as to college professors, editors, labor leaders and businessmen. So long as we have civil liberties, we shall all continue to choose, within the law, what and whom we will support. Movie stars will continue to endorse what they please, and on their own terms—or those of their agents. Shall we deny this freedom only to clergymen—or perchance only to Catholic clergymen? Not if we believe in civil liberties.

These examples cited by Mr. Trowbridge were simply statements of position, arguments, enforcement of their own regulations by private institutions, or personal choices in controversial matters. None of them was criminal or illegal. Legal non-coöperation with what one does not like is the essence of freedom. To make this kind of non-coöperation illegal would be to destroy freedom. These instances constitute clear proof that we are a free society and that the fight for Catholic Emancipation is not still to be made. Not a thing to which Mr. Trowbridge objected could ever be prohibited in a free country, or could ever be allowed in a totalitarian country except by the grace of some government official. Fortunately in America we are not a monolithic state. We enjoy the advantages of various cultural and social objectives, of a complex and multifarious social structure, and of civil liberties.

These advantages of a free society can be ours only so long as we can keep our civil liberties. That means freedom of objective, of choice, of opinion, of speech, *under the law*, for both sides, the wrong side as well as the right side, of every controversy. Those who believe only in civil liberties for *their* side do not believe in civil liberties at all.

Brooklyn, N. Y. J. M. O'NEILL

[Professor O'Neill has hopelessly confused two entirely different matters: the right of Catholics to agitate against birth control, and the results of that agitation as they affect non-Catholics. There is not one word in the Rev. Mr. Trowbridge's article suggesting that the civil liberties of Catholics should be abrogated, and Professor O'Neill's concern on this point is wholly unnecessary. What Mr. Trowbridge was complaining of was not the fact that Catholics want to agitate against birth control, but that they don't want non-Catholics to be permitted to agitate in its favor. Mr. Trowbridge's article gave a whole series of incidents where Catholics have sought by legislation or by social or financial pressure to prevent non-Catholics from debating the merits of, or information about, birth control. He objected to undemocratic procedures and harmful social results of attempting to force on the entire community special Catholic ideas which seem of highly questionable morality to non-Catholics; but there was not the slightest suggestion in Mr. Trowbridge's article that the civil liberties of Catholics should be restricted. As he wrote:

> No one can question the right of Catholic leadership to denounce birth control in vehement terms. No one can question the right of Catholic clergy to prescribe the most severe maledictions on followers who use methods of birth control not approved by the Church. But, one asks, in this year of democracy's crisis—what of the rights of the parents of some 28 million non-Catholic American families who might like to make up their own minds on this subject?

In the light of that paragraph, Professor O'Neill's statements seem to us extraordinary, to say the least.

Mr. O'Neill would appear to argue that it was all in the spirit of good campaigning for a priest to threaten to deprive Protestant and Jewish doctors of the facilities of a Catholic hospital if they prescribed birth control to non-Catholic patients in their private practice. The doctors were pressured at the expense of not having any place to take other patients desperately in need of hospital care. Is this what Mr. O'Neill calls "freedom," or is it a mild brand of fascism? Would Mr. O'Neill equally defend under his definition of "civil liberties" the right of a Protestant hospital to disbar Catholic doctors and their patients if the physicians involved refused to provide Catholic clients with birth-control equipment?

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The Archbishop of Baltimore, under the American Constitution, is not compelled to coöperate with any individual or group he considers unworthy of association. But the spirit of that document would also seem to restrain the Archbishop in the use of his position to deny other groups and individuals free discussion on matters on which their opinions differ. The Baltimore prelate could not have been unmindful of the fact that his threat of non-coöperation in the Baltimore War and Community Fund, coming during the height of the fund campaign, would prevent the holding of a meeting under sponsorship of the YWCA and the Planned Parenthood League of Maryland, from whose purposes he dissented. We don't see much difference between using political influence to have the police break up a public assembly, and using the desire for community harmony in wartime to break up free speech and coöperation among non-Catholic agencies.

Mr. O'Neill has carefully dodged the question as to whether health programs and health services of our communities should serve the needs and wishes of all the people, or should be patterned to fit what the Catholic Church thinks the people should receive. Every public-opinion poll has shown the people in vast majority in favor of having married couples receive birth-control advice through normal health services, if they want it. Ignoring this democratic expression, the Catholic hierarchy works behind the scenes to withhold such knowledge.

As the result of Catholic duress, only one radio station in Massachusetts permitted birth-control supporters to speak their opinions on the air during the referendum on legalizing birth control in that state in 1942. Are such actions in the "democratic" tradition of free, open campaigning?

Incidentally, Professor O'Neill's statement about the *New Republic* is incorrect. We did not decline to give expression to his views. We only declined to give those views our editorial endorsement. What Professor O'Neill urged upon us would be, it seems to us, an act of intellectual dishonesty on our part. – THE EDITORS]

The Bandwagon

Truman's a fine fellow. He'll do all right as President. He'll do all right because this is the greatest country in the world, and our opportunities are as great today as ever, and few leaders could fail with that advantage. – *Former Senator James J. Davis of Pennsylvania, as quoted in the Los Angeles* Times.

Mr. Truman's intimates are definite in describing the new President's philosophy as utterly opposed to a situation where . . . any one individual should exercise an influence above the others. . . .

After an hour's conference, it was understood that Mr. Byrnes would, in effect, replace Harry Hopkins as presidential confidant, and, it was asserted, receive far more authority than a President has yet yielded to any man. – *Lewis Wood in the New York* Times.

Tribute

Many Broadway showmen who cut out matinees of their productions last Saturday as a tribute to President Roosevelt, also, it turns out, cut out part of their actors' salaries. Although several shows paid their performers in full . . . many productions withheld one-eighth of the actor's salary from his paycheck.

PM learned yesterday that theatre ushers, who make about $15 a week, also were docked one-eighth of their wages in all theatres operated by the Shuberts, although those working in independent houses were paid in full. – *From* PM.

Brave New World

The House also passed by a vote of 110 to 0 a bill to permit veterans of World War II to obtain free peddlers' licenses in Ohio. – *From the Cleveland* Plain Dealer.

On the Home Front

Lloyd T. Binford, chairman of the Memphis Board of Motion Picture Censors, said the United Artists picture, "Brewster's Millions," had been banned here because it "presented too much familiarity between the races." Binford asserted the movie was banned on the ground it was "inimical to the public welfare."

"The movie has Rochester (Eddie Anderson), the Negro comedian, in an important role," Binford said. "He has too familiar a way about him and the picture presents too much social equality and racial mixture. We don't have any trouble with racial problems down here and we don't intend to encourage any by showing movies like this." – *From the Norfolk* Virginian Pilot.

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of the New Republic. *Please enclose the original clipping.* – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

The Chinese Delegation

SIR: I was surprised to find that a piece of near, if not pure and simple, "subversive propaganda" against one of your ally governments—the National Government of China—appeared in your respectable weekly, the April 9 issue. Under the column "International Notes" the writer interpreted the appointment of Tung Pi-wu, one of China's ten delegates to the San Francisco Conference, as "one case of the reactionary Chungking government's attempts to deceive world opinion and discredit the Chinese Communists." The reasons given by the writer, or rather, given to the writer, were three. "Tung Pi-wu, I am told, though an old revolutionary," ran the article, "has absolutely no special abilities nor does he speak any foreign language, but above all he does not in any way represent the Communist government." Does the writer know for sure who Tung Pi-wu is? Obviously not. Let me give him this bit of information so that he will not jump to any rash conclusion discrediting Mr. Tung and condemning the Chinese government. Mr. Tung, who spent his early years in Japan—that is, he speaks at least one foreign language—is a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Tung, who is now 60 years old, was one of the 11 delegates to the first meeting of the Chinese Communist Party at Shanghai in 1921, and was once a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and president of the Supreme Court of the old Chinese Soviet regime—that is, he must have some special abilities among the Chinese Communists. Since the war began he has served as a member of the People's Political Council and has always spoken or acted on behalf of the Chinese Communists in Yennan, from where, according to the latest information, he arrived in Chungking on April 7 to get ready to attend

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the conference—that is, he does represent the Chinese Communists. May I, for the information of your readers at least, add: Among the ten Chinese delegates, six of them are non-Kuomintang members, namely Hu Shih, well known philosopher; Wu Yi-fang, foremost woman leader and educator; Li Hwang, leader of the Chinese Nationalist Youth Party; Carson Chang, the leader of the Chinese National Socialist Party; Hu Lin, influential and independent journalist; and Tung Pi-wu, leading member of the Chinese Communist Party. The Kuomintang members are T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister and acting Premier; Wang Chung-hui, Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council and former judge of The Hague International Court; Wellington Koo and Wei Tao-ming, ambassadors to Great Britain and the United States, respectively. Any fair-minded reader would agree that this is a nearly ideal composition for a delegation that the Chinese government could send to the United Nations conference. But to the writer of the "International Notes" it may be another case of "You're damned if you do, you're damned if you don't."

Mexico City (by cable) LIN LIN

SIR: Mr. Lin Lin's cable is additional evidence of what I said in "International Notes" of April 9, 1945, namely, that the appointment of Mr. Tung (and of other non-Kuomintang delegates) is a superb case of window-dressing. Mr. Lin does not prove Tung's ability to handle foreign affairs except by saying that he "spent his early years in Japan." Even if he knows Japanese, this will hardly be helpful at San Francisco. Mr. Lin says that Tung "is a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party." He should say that he "was." His serving in the powerless, Kuomintang-controlled People's Political Council in Chungking since the war began is equally irrelevant to his ability to represent the Communists at the San Francisco Conference. But above all, Mr. Lin presents absolutely no evidence to prove that Tung is authorized by the Yennan Communist government to represent it in San Francisco. He will attend the conference not as a delegate of the Yennan government, but of the Chungking government. He has no mandate from Yennan and cannot speak on its behalf (if he can speak at all). What I said in "International Notes" still stands, just as the protest of Yennan against Chungking's monopolizing of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco conference still stands.

New York City E. L. P.

Russia and Poland

SIR: Mr. Varian Fry's criticism [the *New Republic*, April 16] certainly was extremely one-sided and you have answered some of his points very effectively. Nevertheless, there is a kernel of truth in what he said, which the *New Republic* cannot afford to disregard.

In this country, public opinion is slowly but inexorably turning against Soviet Russia, on account of the Polish question. Nobody cares how Rumania or Bulgaria are treated—they were foes and fascist anyway—but Poland, for the defense of which against totalitarian aggression the democracies entered the war, is considered the testing ground for the ultimate aims of the Soviets.

It is not the question here whether Russia has reason to complain about Anglo-American policy (though one must assume that Argentina's invitation to San Francisco is formally covered by the Yalta decisions). The general feeling is: If Russia is genuinely satisfied with the destruction of fascism and does not strive for the extension of communism across her frontier, she must not make the democratic broadening of the Polish government *dependent* on *any concession* from her allies.

Totalitarian governments are unable to understand the processes in which public opinion ultimately shapes policy in a democratic country. The greater is the responsibility of such organs as the *New Republic* to make them understand. For on the understanding between the Russian and the American people the peace of the years to come depends; without such genuine understanding Dumbarton Oaks would remain an empty shell.

Floral Park, N. Y. HANS NEISSER

[We were never very much impressed by the fact that it was "Poland for the defense of which against totalitarian aggression the democracies entered the war." The same democracies let Hitler occupy the Rhineland, absorb Austria, dismember Czechoslovakia and destroy the Spanish Republic. It was an accident of nationality that the Polish reactionaries and anti-Semites happened to be on our side in the war. Their motivation for resisting Hitler was not any love of democracy, but a fierce nationalism, if not chauvinism. There were before the war Polish democrats, but there was no Polish democratic state. This is not meant to imply, of course, that we do not desire a free, democratic Poland or that we disagree with Mr. Neisser's appraisal of the role of public opinion with regard to Russia.—THE EDITORS]

Out-to-Lunch Department

SIR: May I submit the following, from your "Washington Notes" in the April 2 issue, for the Bandwagon:

> The German armies are hopelessly outclassed and outnumbered. This present, supreme, all-front drive will continue until Anglo-American armies, moving west, meet Russian armies, coming east.

Is it possible that T.R.B. has lost his sense of direction or does he believe that "the longest way round is the sweetest way home"? Or is it that

> East is east, and west is west,
> And never the twain shall meet?

Washington, D. C. MRS. GUY S. COOK

[Another reader, Roger Curtis of Vancouver, B. C., found the same error in T. R. B.'s column.—THE EDITORS]

From The New Republic Mail Bag

We have received an announcement that fiction and non-fiction awards of $2,500 each, in the Macmillan Centenary Awards for the Armed Forces of the United Nations, have gone to two 34-year-old army sergeants. Sergeant Josiah A. Greene, of Washington, Connecticut, received the fiction prize for his novel, *Not in Our Stars*, and Staff Sergeant Spencer Logan, of North Plainfield, New Jersey, received the non-fiction award for his *Democracy Needs the Negro*.

Irving Caesar, of New York City, sends us a copy of his pamphlet, "Peace by Wireless," a proposal for an international radio agreement wherein the signatories guarantee that their people shall have the right to listen without interference to official uncensored broadcasts by the other signatories.

Miss H. Lorine Pickett of St. Louis, Missouri, writes to us in favor of the equal-rights amendment. She says, "Where women have the same ability, training, technical skill and professional ability, they should receive the same compensation and the same treatment that men are given."

Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama, is soliciting funds for a postwar replacement of its power plant. The plant is more than 25 years old, and its replacement will cost $600,000. Present condition of the plant necessitates the use of funds which could otherwise be used for education of Tuskegee students.

James Loeb Jr., executive secretary of the Union for Democratic Action, will address the members of the Cincinnati, Ohio, Progressive Citizens' Committee on May 2.

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Books in Review

Santayana in Society

THE SECOND volume of George Santayana's memoirs—he calls it *The Middle Span*[1]—is shorter than the first, and the substance of it seems thinner, too. He is dealing now with the quarter-century between his graduation from Harvard in 1886 and his sudden resignation as a professor in 1912. This is the ground that he has gone over before: he wrote about some of his students in his one novel, *The Last Puritan*, and about James and Royce, his two great colleagues of the Philosophy Department, in a volume of lectures, *Character and Opinion in the United States*. But there was more to be said concerning his own connection with Harvard in those years, and Santayana has omitted too much of it. He tells us almost nothing, for example, about the young writers who were students in his courses or visitors to his various rooms in the Yard. Some of them would play a considerable part in the abortive renaissance of the 1890's, or in the literature of political protest during the early 1900's, or in the revolt against the genteel tradition that began about 1910. During all three decades, Harvard continued to serve as a nursery for American writers, as it had served in the greater days of New England; and it was not until 1917 or thereabouts that poets and novelists in throngs began to appear from other colleges: first Princeton and Yale, in the war years; then Chicago, Vanderbilt, California, Michigan. . . . As long as Santayana remained at Harvard, he helped to set the tone for writing there, not only by his lectures, which were popular with the literary set, but also by his poems, his poetry readings, his philosophical essays and his legendary conversation at the dinners of the O.K. Society. Yet there is so little mention of literature in his memoirs that at one point he stops to apologize.

"I have commemorated many American friends," he says, "and not one man of letters, not one poet." By way of atonement, he then devotes three lonesome pages to his friend Trumbull Stickney, who might have been a great poet except that he lived in the wrong age and died too soon. There were other poets at Harvard in those years: Edwin Arlington Robinson and Robert Frost, to mention only two; but both of these were poor boys, socially unrecognized, and they were not likely to attract Santayana's attention. As a young instructor, he liked to associate with the college swells. He was pleased when the O.K., which had been started as a literary society, began to admit athletes and Gold Coast politicians. He said in the first volume of his memoirs: "I liked to feel a spark of sympathy pass from those sound simple active heirs of the dominant class to my secret philosophy: and sometimes the spark did pass, and in both directions." He was a snob in those days, to put the matter bluntly, and later he tried to excuse himself. "It might seem," he said, "that all my life I have been 'sponging' on my rich friends, or even that I have sought rich friends for that purpose. This was not the case: there were plenty of rich people about that I fled from. But with people with whom I was otherwise in sympathy, friendship was naturally more easily kept up and cemented if they had a house where they could ask me to stay, or could invite me to be their guest, partly or wholly, for trips or entertainments that I couldn't afford if left to my own resources." Elsewhere he often praises the simple life—"Anything suffices," he says, "if nothing else is demanded"—and he makes you think of Oscar Wilde's remark that his own tastes were simple, he wanted only the best.

He valued kind hearts, and valued them all the more if they beat under coronets. The highest moment in his undergraduate career was when he received a visit from the second Earl Russell, who had been directed to Santayana's room by one of his rich friends. As the young earl looked out of the window, Santayana says, "at the muddy paths and shabby grass, the elms standing scattered at equal intervals, the ugly factory-like buildings and the loud-voiced youths passing by, dressed like shop assistants, I could well conceive his thoughts, and I said apologetically that after Oxford all this must seem to him rather mean; and he replied curtly, 'Yes, it does.' " Santayana was not in the least offended. He went on to explain, so he says, "our manner of life, our social distinctions, our choice of studies, our sports, our food, our town amusements. He listened politely, obviously rather entertained and not displeased to find that, according to my description, all I described might be dismissed forever without further thought." It was the beginning of a friendship that lasted forty-five years, until John Francis Stanley Russell died and the earldom passed to his younger brother Bertrand, the philosopher. Santayana had only two complaints against his friend. The first was "that being the heir to so many privileges he should appreciate them so little, and should use the strength that he derived from tradition in deriding tradition and destroying it"—in brief, that he joined the Labor Party. The second wasn't that he got himself involved in curious love affairs—with two sisters at once, Santayana implies, and again with a mother and a daughter—but rather that he couldn't keep his wives and mistresses out of court. "A young man with a brilliant career open to him in the world is a fool to flout public opinion," Santayana says, "even if he secretly despises it. Peace with the polite world is all-important for one's comfort and euphoria so long as one lives in the polite world."

Peace with the polite world and the political world and all the reigning powers is a central point in Santayana's philosophy. He describes himself as "a materialist, cynic and Tory."—"Regal and priestly grandeur," he says, "even dimly suggested, has always impressed me." He wept at one of Queen Victoria's processions, and when he first trod the steps of Windsor Castle, it was "not without profound emotion." For all his Anglomania, he also admired the provincial nobility of Boston; and he was even willing, as an instructor, to accept and observe the social judgments of

[1] The Middle Span: Persons and Places, Vol. II, by George Santayana. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 187 pages. $2.50.

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Harvard undergraduates. The proudest moment of his teaching career seems not to have been the publication of *The Sense of Beauty*, his first philosophical work, and neither was it his formal appointment to the faculty; instead of these, it was his election as a graduate member of the Gas House, then the most elegant of the so-called "waiting clubs." In his rooms he used to give poetry readings, chiefly to club members. Once he tried to introduce his friend Trumbull Stickney to these readings—"But no," he says, "it wouldn't do. Julian confidentially informed me that 'the others didn't like him'. Why not? Because he had mentioned the sunset and called it 'gorgeous.'" Santayana bowed to their judgment and excluded the one gifted poet who might have attended their poetry evenings. Their standards were false and foolish, he felt, but it would also be foolish to object to them. Precisely by not objecting, he confirmed and strengthened the false standards. Those were the days when Harvard was afflicted with a multiplicity of caste distinctions: Yard against Gold Coast; clubs against fraternities against the great mass of the unaffiliated and unrecognized. Santayana had nothing to do with founding the system, but in one sense he bears a little of the responsibility for it: that is, he approved it, followed its rules, and gave it the support of his prestige as a philosopher.

That is part of the story he tells between the lines of his memoirs; but besides this comedy of manners there are also hints of a private drama with painful overtones. Apparently the year 1896 marked a crisis in Santayana's life. "My young friends," he says, "had become too young for me and I too old for them; I had made a private peace with all religions and philosophies; and I had grown profoundly weary of polite society and casual gayeties." After taking a year's leave of absence, which he spent at the English Cambridge, he returned to Harvard; but he had lost his belief in teaching together with most of his social ambitions; indeed, he suggests that the next fifteen years were a somnambulistic period in his life and one he would like to forget. On receiving a legacy in 1912, he at once resigned his professorship and sailed for Europe, never to return.

The period that followed will be described in the third volume of his memoirs. On the whole it was happier and more productive than his last years at Harvard; and yet there seems to be something forced and almost inhuman in its serenity. He says: "For the future, I desired nothing fixed, no place in society, no circle of prescribed friends and engagements. . . . For constant company I had enough, and too much, with myself." Again he says: "The intellectual world of my time alienated me intellectually. It was a Babel of false principles and blind cravings, a zoölogical garden of the mind, and I had no desire to be one of the beasts. I wished to remain a visitor, looking in at the cages." Santayana had always regarded himself as a visitor; he had been a Spaniard in America, an American in England, an Englishman in Rome, and even his relatives in Avila, his birthplace, had regarded him as a transatlantic cousin. Now the process of alienation would be carried still further, as he watched the death struggles of Europe with little interest and less understanding. When he mentioned them at all, it would be in the voice of a Martian on earth, or rather—so little likeness do his observations bear to our own picture of events—in the voice of a strayed earthling on Mars.

MALCOLM COWLEY

A Liberal's Credo

Freedom Is More Than a Word, by Marshall Field. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 189 pages. $2.50.

THIS BOOK is the credo of Marshall Field. It tells why the multi-millionaire Chicagoan, who was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, rather unexpectedly in middle-age founded *PM* and the Chicago *Sun*, entered the radio field, and brought an anti-trust suit against the Associated Press. Mr. Field is also interested in the publication of popular book reprints and is contemplating entering the important "boiler-plate" industry to supply features to small-town newspapers.

To Mr. Field it all seems simple. He believes that the average man is a pretty decent fellow and will act in a fairly reasonable manner if he has access to the facts. But he doesn't get the facts. In some countries it is because there aren't any newspapers; in the United States because, Mr. Field believes, the newspapers are slanted—in the direction of conservatism and property rights. He regards this as dangerous and has set out, in simple and straightforward manner, to do something about it. He has launched the only two new metropolitan newspapers to be founded in the United States in a decade, and promises before he is through to be one of the important factors in the dissemination of news and opinions in America. As a Washington reporter I can testify to the refreshing effect of Mr. Field's arrival on the capital scene. Liberalism has, in fact, been reinforced in the Washington press corps by the addition of the considerable Chicago *Sun* and *PM* bureaus, and it is rather charming to see the respectability attaching to a point of view backed by the Field millions.

Only a part of Mr. Field's book deals directly with journalism, but it is the most interesting part. He takes up the alarming trend toward what Victor Rosewater called "consolidation and extermination" in American journalism where competition is declining through a process known in the army as "cannibalization." A city is lucky today that does not have a newspaper monopoly. In 1920 some 549 cities had competing newspapers; in 1942, only 127. And even the 25 biggest cities now average only one and one-half morning papers and two evening papers.

You can see why more papers aren't started when you read Mr. Field's account of his own difficulties. In Chicago, for example, people were wedded to the *Tribune's* "comics," whatever they felt about its foreign views. Then there was the dominating Associated Press. Mr. Field was excluded from the mutual organization that serves 95.5 percent of the morning daily circulation in the country. This matter is now *sub judice* before the Supreme Court, but whether or not the AP is a monopoly, Mr. Field makes plain the financial cost of not being a member.

Mr. Field writes of his ventures with detachment. His papers are not perfect, he agrees. Yet—"the average newspaperman, wherever he works, lives in a different climate of opinion and breathes a different air because of *PM*." Mr. Field writes with simplicity, modesty, almost humility. If I were a rich man, I can think of nothing that would be more fun than running a couple of newspapers, but Mr. Field is not interested in journalism merely as a fascinating hobby, nor does he talk like a man interested in

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

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BLACK BOY

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—*The New Republic*

By the author of NATIVE SON

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power for its own sake. He wants power because it will aid democracy, and he seems inclined to go right ahead with the idea.

Mr. Field's abstract discussion of "freedom," with which he is largely concerned, is well enough if a little dull, and he makes important points. He finds a dogmatic insistence in America upon "tolerance," for example, which too often neglects understanding; and he objects to "the infernal gentlemanliness" of our educational tradition. But the chief interest in the book is the light it throws on Mr. Field's motives and upon Mr. Field. This is the credo of a simple, modest liberal, who thought that something ought to be done to help democracy and set out to do it. That he came to the job equipped with a lot of money seems more or less an accident.

RICHARD LEE STROUT

Tocqueville on Democracy

Democracy in America, by Alexis de Tocqueville. Edited by Phillips Bradley. Foreword by Harold Laski. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2 vols; 835 pages. $6.

HAROLD LASKI calls *Democracy in America* "perhaps the greatest work ever written on any country by the citizen of another." Tocqueville's book thus takes its place by the side of Voltaire's *Philosophical Letters*, Madame de Staël's *Germany* and Bryce's *American Commonwealth*. The praise is well deserved; but I should like to shift the emphasis. Tocqueville's book is not, like Bryce's or Siegfried's, the study of a country; it is the discussion of a principle; it is not descriptive, but philosophical; its subject is not America, but Democracy.

As a travel diary, it would hardly be worth reprinting. George Pierson's capital work, *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America*, would be a perfect substitute for the original. It is a meditation on Democracy, with America as the best available example. The America of 1831 is a curiosity; democracy remains a vital problem.

The method, it must be confessed, is dangerous. Taine and Irving Babbitt used it without a qualm. For them, investigation (and they were painstaking workers) meant the gathering of evidence in support of a preconceived dogma. Duhamel sought in America lurid illustrations of his belief that a mechanical civilization is bound to be harsh, mean and ugly. William L. White has just done a job of the same kind for Soviet Russia. The result may be impressive; it is not scientifically sound.

The condemnation, however, does not fully apply to Tocqueville's work. Sainte-Beuve criticized him because "he started thinking before he had learned anything." But, without taking thought, it is impossible to learn. Tocqueville was conscientious and open-minded to an unusual degree. He did not simply ignore, or brush aside as irrelevant, the facts that did not tally with his prejudices. The key to his remarkable objectivity is that his preferences and the conclusions to which he was driven were at odds. By birth, training, sympathies, he was an aristocrat. He had become convinced that democracy was inevitable. He went to observe in America the Europe, the world of tomorrow; and he came to the conclusion that democracy might be tolerable after all.

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What did he mean by Democracy? Like the rest of us, he used the term with many different shades. Democracy, like religion, romanticism or love, is Protean; to be accurate, we should speak of Democracy 17, or Romanticism 22. But his fundamental concept was perfectly clear. He followed Jefferson and anticipated Lincoln: for him, democracy meant equality. No democrat has ever maintained the equivalence of all men in every field; democracy is equality of rights, equality of status, without which there can be no genuine liberty. It implies the utter rejection of privilege, which is the perpetuation of unjustified inequalities. If blondes are actually superior to brunettes, democracy does not attempt to suppress the fact; but it has to be established in free and fair competition. This in its turn implies, not the harmonious coöperation of the classes, but the condemnation of the class idea altogether. In a democracy, there must be no "underprivileged" and no "privileged" groups. Democracy is the common ground of all men, or, if you prefer, the realm of the common man.

For Tocqueville

> the gradual development of the principle of equality is a providential fact. It has all the chief characteristics of such a fact: it is universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress. . . . Would it, then, be wise to imagine that a social movement the causes of which lie so far back can be checked by the efforts of one generation? Can it be believed that the democracy which has overthrown the feudal system and vanquished kings will retreat before tradesmen and capitalists?

These words, with their strangely modern ring, answer the charge that Tocqueville ignored the industrial revolution. He did not give it that name, which did not come into general use until the first Arnold Toynbee about 1880. But, like Saint-Simon, he had a philosophical premonition of it. When America was still overwhelmingly agrarian, he thought of "capitalists," saw the trend toward industrialism, and propounded the question: "How an aristocracy may be created by manufactures." His prophecies or warnings on that point, as Mr. Bradley notes, came "a decade before the *Communist Manifesto*, a quarter-century before *Das Kapital*."

He did not sufficiently stress the influence of English tradition. But his subject was Democracy; what we owe to England is different. Liberty, constitutional rights, representative institutions, parliamentary methods, judicial procedure, all these things are admirable no doubt, but they are not essentially democratic. Mr. Churchill is not a democrat; and a democracy, as Lord Tweedsmuir remarked, could be of a pattern totally different from the British.

Democracy in America is a classic, that is to say a living book. We are thankful for this new edition, which is both handsome and convenient. Perhaps publisher and editor were a little too modest: an entirely new translation might have been fresher than a revision of Bowen's revision of Reeve's uninspired text. Tocqueville is not a stylist, but he writes well, and deserves the best. I am sorry Mr. Bradley did the late Emile Faguet the discourtesy of twice misspelling his name. *Politiques et Moralistes* is the masterpiece of that overabundant but stimulating critic, and his essay on Tocqueville might profitably have been incorporated into the Introduction.

ALBERT GUÉRARD

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DOUBLEDAY, DORAN

Fields and Factories

The Farmer and the Rest of Us, by Arthur Moore. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. An Atlantic Monthly Press Book. 226 pages. $2.50.
Pleasant Valley, by Louis Bromfield. New York: Harper and Brothers. 302 pages. $3.
Straw in the Sun, by Charlie May Simon. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 253 pages. $2.75.

AMID THE STACK of current volumes on food and farming, Arthur Moore's new book must be marked as an important prescription for our times. It deserves this distinction, despite minor limitations, because Mr. Moore unearths some basic problems of agriculture in our industrial economy and shows clearly that the conflict between farm and labor groups is a shadow across the American promise. Actually, of course, farmer-labor hatred is a social disease comparable to isolationism and racial prejudice.

Editor of a paper in McLean County, Illinois, Mr. Moore knows the people who work the big, commercial farms that are the very heart of the nation's food system; and knowing them, he respects their dignity and trusts their judgment. It is precisely because of this background and sympathy that unusual significance attaches to the story of his search for "the core-facts about agriculture's relation to the rest of society" and to his conclusion that the "overwhelming fact" is agriculture's dependence upon a laboring class that is "able to defend its pay check, able to retire on adequate pensions, and assured of money enough for a good diet during periods of unemployment."

It cannot be said that Mr. Moore arrives at a full analysis —nor would he say so; in fact, he warns that the rural social sciences must be given vigorous and unbiased support if there is to be any hope for wider understanding of the fundamental problems confronting agriculture. But where he does dig, his insight leads him to pay dirt. He is able to see that the underlying questions revolve around property rather than prices. The explanation of both radical and conservative rural politics is found in the farmer's interest in property, and the whole history of American agricultural policy is the story of his quest for land ownership. In the final analysis, competition for land syphons off farmers' gains into higher land values, and thus sets short-sighted policies on a hopeless treadmill.

Fortunately, an increasing number of others are coming to realize what Mr. Moore knows: that we have gone "about as far as [we] can go with existing programs . . . if food resources are to be brought into lasting adjustment with the needs of our civilization." The establishment of a permanent and satisfying agriculture requires a new emphasis in farm policy. Direct improvements in farm living conditions, rural education and land tenure are essential to the preservation of the soil, and all of these in turn depend upon the solution of the national problem of full employment and the assurance of adequate nutrition for all. We must set our sights on "the fundamentals such as land care and better rural living and away from commodity quarrels, short-run price jockeying and attacks on rival organizations." Mr. Moore writes this prescription specifically for the leaders of the Farm Bureau, which includes two-thirds of the farmers of his county and which he hopes will enroll

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more of them, but it is good medicine for the entire economy.

It is difficult to see why anyone would take exception to Mr. Moore's general counsel. His list of recommended measures is pertinent but not complete, partly because he is most familiar with corn-belt conditions. He sees the danger in present policies which freeze "some habitual form of agriculture" even after it has "outlived its natural economic usefulness," yet he does not indicate the importance of working out positive programs to help shift such types of farming over to the production of commodities that are really needed. Assistance of this kind has long been overdue in the cotton region and after the war it will be necessary in some Western wheat areas and elsewhere. Mr. Moore might also have pointed out that birth-rate differentials and advances in farm technology together force a constant movement of some farm-reared people away from agricultural occupations. This powerful fact adds emphasis to the need for land-use adjustment programs, improvements in rural living, medical and educational facilities and, above all, full employment.

While Mr. Moore writes about "pork chops and the people who produce them from the point of view of a man who eats them," *Pleasant Valley* is "frankly, a romantic book." In it, Mr. Bromfield describes the development of a "little kingdom" of one thousand acres which is his self-sufficient "island of security," but his story is loaded with economic theories which are purely physiocratic. On a considerably different basis, Miss Simon spent three years, but practically no money, to carve out 60 acres of Ozark land that she could call her own, even though she doesn't live there any more, and she writes a sprightly account of her homesteading experience. LEONARD A. SALTER JR.

The Psychology of Peace

Human Nature and Enduring Peace, by Gardner Murphy and 53 Others. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, for Reynal and Hitchcock. 475 pages. $3.50.

THE PSYCHOLOGISTS, or some of them, are coming down out of their ivory towers. The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues represents an attempt on the part of scientifically trained men to apply their specialized knowledge in the field of public affairs, where it has so long been needed. This book, the third annual year book of the Society, is a symposium of 53 individuals, most but not all professional psychologists. Under the skillful guidance of Gardner Murphy of Columbia University, who himself contributes several sections, 53 individuals have attempted to answer questions based upon the impulse to war, the obstacles to peace, psychological difficulties of specific nations, the practicality of democracy, and so on. Naturally, the contributors are somewhat uneven in viewpoint and they differ still more in their ability to write. Nevertheless, there is much information of the highest value in these pages. What the psychologists need now is an Edward L. Bernays, or a Chester Bowles, to take the experts' information, boil it to its essentials, and then put it into 20 big charts, and a dozen 2,000-word pamphlets in big type, which even a busy member of Congress will be able—and willing—to read. B. B.

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

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

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A Reader's List

GUNS FOR TITO, by Major Louis Huot (Fischer, $2.75). In October, 1943, shortly after the capitulation of Italy, little was known in the Allied world about the Partisans of Yugoslavia. The reactionary Yugoslav Government-in-Exile was the only body recognized, and the Mihailovich myth was slow in being exploded. It was then that Major Huot, a member of the combined British-American secret operations staff for the Balkans, set out from Cairo to establish a supply route from Bari, Italy, to Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast. Sheer luck rather than official pro-Partisan policy on the part of the Allies enabled him to succeed in delivering 1,000 tons of supplies to the Partisans in the twenty days he was permitted to participate in the operation. His account of those three weeks, in the course of which he met Tito himself, makes fascinating reading and is certainly as much a tribute to the Partisans as to those few Allied officers who knew our friends in Yugoslavia and helped them with all the supplies they could steer their way. But the question why Major Huot was withdrawn from the operation in spite of his success is not answered. Throughout those adventurous days Huot wondered whether his initiative would incur the displeasure of Headquarters. Although he was not court-martialed, as he at times feared, he was assigned to another job. While he carefully avoids giving any reason for this, it strongly suggests that in October, 1943, the Western powers were not yet willing to give all-out aid to Tito. Huot's story adds nothing to the historical record, but it substantiates it.

THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, by Ysabel F. Rennie (Macmillan, $4). This ably written history of Argentina is a useful background study to what has happened in that country during the last two years. These events, the author concludes, put an end to "the Argentine Republic, the liberal, free-trading nation that had built on blooded beef and land, that had been thirteen years dying. . . . Whether the nationalists ruled or fell, whether they gambled their country's future on a crazy military adventure, whether, even, they led it to a bloody and tragic civil war, the revolution of June 4 had written *Finis* to the Republic of 1853."

THE SMALL BACK ROOM, by Nigel Balchin (Houghton Mifflin, $2.50). A novel which created a great stir in England, for obvious reasons: it deals with intrigue in the British War Office, the pressures and rivalries affecting the work of a group of scientists engaged in testing and perfecting weapons for the armed forces. The hero, Sam Rice, has an aluminum foot and an inferiority complex which prevent him from resisting office politics as courageously as he believes a man should do. He sees honest science go unrewarded and clever maneuvering get all the gravy and prestige and is unable to regain his self-respect until he succeeds in taking apart a particularly dangerous anti-personnel bomb that the Germans have been dropping. The scene in which he dismembers the bomb is one of the most effective bits of science-thriller fiction in a long time.

Crime and Punishment

PAYOFF FOR THE BANKER, by Frances and Richard Lockridge (Lippincott, $2). When Mary Hunter comes home from work to her just-rented apartment and finds the bullet-riddled body of George Merle in her living room, she naturally telephones Pam and Jerry North. For she is afraid that the police will find out why she hated Mr. Merle almost enough to murder him, and she has met the Norths and knows their reputation for taking the unpopular, or anti-police, view in a number of famous cases. The Norths come through in fine style, as does their pal, Lieutenant Bill Weigand, detective of parts and regular guy. A literate and engaging job.

THE DEADLY DOVE, by Rufus King (Crime Club, $2). In this screwy tale, Christine Belder, foxy, lively and sixty, converts her considerable fortune into an annuity unbeknownst to her brand-new young husband, Alan Admont, ham actor and heel extraordinary. Since Alan has already made arrangements with a racketeer to have Christine bumped off by the Dove (a reliable handyman in the racketeer's employ), his problem becomes one of thwarting the Dove's assignment. Rather haphazard entertainment; Mr. King can do—and has done—better. E. H.

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Contributors

Irving Brant was for many years a St. Louis newspaperman. His most recent book is *Road to Peace and Freedom*, and he is now at work on the second volume of *James Madison: The Virginia Revolutionist*, the first volume of which was published in 1941.

Gaetano Salvemini, at one time professor of History at the University of Florence, holds the Lauro de Bosis Lectureship in the History of Italian Civilization at Harvard. He is co-author, with George La Piana, of *What to Do with Italy*.

Alexander H. Pekelis, member of the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research, has been working on the problem of human rights as the Chief Consultant to the Commission on Law and Legislation, American Jewish Congress, which has adopted the substance of his suggestions.

Raymond Arthur Davies is a Moscow correspondent for several Canadian and American newspapers and magazines.

Richard Lee Strout is a member of the Washington staff of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Albert Guérard, a member of the faculty of Stanford University, is the author of several books on French civilization, including *France of Tomorrow*, and a new book, *Europe: Free and United*, just published by the Stanford University Press. He is now at work on a short history of France to be published early next year by W. W. Norton.

Leonard A. Salter Jr. is an associate professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of Wisconsin and editor of the *Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics*.

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World Security

The San Francisco Conference

A Special Section



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION PROPOSED AT DUMBARTON OAKS

The proposals were recommended to the governments of the United Nations by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, USSR and China and released on October 9, 1944.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

April 30, 1945 *In two parts: Part Two*

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San Francisco and You

A Message on Behalf of the Hebrew Nation to All Americans—Protestants, Catholics and Jews

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No Hebrew* delegates have been invited to sit at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. This means that more than four million Hebrew casualties in this ruthless world war, the tremendous contribution of the Hebrew people toward winning the certain victory of the Allied Nations, do not deserve acknowledgment. Worse than that, the wretched survivors do not deserve any consideration or any plan for rehabilitation and freedom.

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Ask yourself—How long can a democratic peace endure that starts out with omissions and reservations?

Ask yourself whether it is just—whether it is a good augury for world peace that among all the peoples of the world the Hebrews of Palestine and their brethren in Europe alone will be excluded from representing their cause before the council of the United Nations.

No people, from the last minute bandwagon belligerents right down to England itself, has suffered such casualties and dislocations as the Hebrews—none needs more desperately to have its representatives sit at the deliberations—no nation has so old or so sore a problem to resolve as has the Hebrew people.

Democracy is an embattled cause which must be defended from every parapet—every loophole must be sealed against the re-entry of fascism and tyranny.

Americans are vitally interested in the rights of a minority people that has been battered from pillar to post and is now about to be dealt another mortal blow by the powers which purport to deliberate and plan in the name of the Four Freedoms.

That is why the American League for a Free Palestine is determined that the Hebrew question will be on the agenda of San Francisco. Join us.

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2. To rebuild Palestine in its historic boundaries, with the Arab population as equal partners—as a democratic state based on the principles of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter.

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WORLD SECURITY

The San Francisco Conference

A Special Section

What Dumbarton Oaks Is—and Isn't[1]

THIS SPECIAL SECTION of the *New Republic* went to press only a few days after the news flashed around the globe of the sudden and profoundly tragic death of President Roosevelt, the most sincere friend of international organization for collective security among the powerful leaders of the world. It is much too early to estimate the effect of his passing upon the chances of the new organization which is about to take shape at San Francisco. Meanwhile, those who share his belief in the possibility that war can be ended and a true society of nations brought into being can best honor his memory by continuing the fight in which he was such a stalwart figure.

The chief purpose of the Dumbarton Oaks plan is to organize the peaceful nations of the world in such a way as to make future wars less likely. For that purpose two main bodies are to be created—a Security Council and a General Assembly. In this, the pattern of the old League of Nations is followed, which also had a Council and an Assembly. The pattern of the former league is likewise followed in that the Security Council, although smaller than the Assembly, holds most of the power.

The Security Council consists of eleven members. Five of them are the chief Allies in the present war, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China and France. (Because, it was said, France had not been fully liberated and restored at the time the Dumbarton Oaks Conference began, she was not invited to participate in the original discussions.) The other six members will be chosen from countries which are members of the General Assembly, and elected by that Assembly for terms of two years each. The General Assembly is to consist, at the beginning, of those powers which have participated in one phase or another of the war against the Axis; eventually, however, the neutral countries can join if they wish, and so can the present enemies, on giving proper evidence of repentance and reformation.

[1] The full text of the original Dumbarton Oaks proposals, as modified in the Crimean Conference, appears on page 618 of this special section.

This special section was written by Bruce Bliven, Heinz Eulau, Max Lerner, James Loeb Jr. and George Soule. – THE EDITORS

Five subsidiary or affiliated organizations would be connected with the new league. The military staff committee would consist of representatives of the general staffs of the member nations. Its most important duty would be, upon a decision by the Security Council that an act of aggression had been committed, to notify the various member powers, or some of them, what military and naval forces each would be required to furnish for the purpose of overcoming the forces of the aggressor nation. There is also an International Court of Justice which will decide disputes justiciable under international law. Presumably this will be either the Permanent Court of International Justice of the existing League of Nations or a new body which parallels it closely.

There is also a Secretary General, who is to be elected by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. He will be aided by a Secretariat with the customary panopoly of administrators, experts in various subjects, and so on.

An extremely important part of the new organization is to be the Economic and Social Council of eighteen members, elected by the Assembly. If the new league comes into being, this group may prove, with the passage of years, to be its most important unit. Its field is social, economic, labor and humanitarian activities. It will presumably (the matter has not yet been definitely decided) take under its wing as well the International Labor Office, formerly at Geneva, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and committees and bureaus dealing with health, welfare, the use of narcotics, and safeguards for women and children.

If this Economic and Social Council adopted a bold and vigorous policy, it could go far toward making the machinery of the Security Council unnecessary, by abolishing disputes before they begin. It could, for example, control the allocation of dwindling natural resources such as oil and metals; ensure fair play in international competition for foreign markets; prevent the ruthless exploitation of the peoples and resources of backward regions; control or abolish the interna-

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tional traffic in arms; encourage the development and maintenance of prosperity and a high standard of living in parts of the world which today know only poverty.

No sooner was the Dumbarton Oaks plan made public than a host of suggestions for altering it were brought forward. In general, these concerned themselves with three sets of problems: the rights of middle-sized and small nations, voting procedure in the Security Council, and fitting into the framework existing regional agreements such as the Russian-French treaty and the new version of the Monroe Doctrine written at Mexico City in the Act of Chapultepec.

The Polish Government-in-Exile, in London, made these general suggestions: membership should be universal and obligatory; the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms should be included; the Security Council should consist of fifteen members instead of eleven, and action should be taken by a majority of eight, including any three of the Big Five. None of the Big Five should have a veto on charges involving itself; any member of the organization should sit with the Council when it is under charges. The Council should investigate any issue on a request from any member. All special regional understandings should be abolished. Every nation should be guaranteed its present territory and its political independence, and the new league should not undertake to solve disarmament or boundary problems.

The Latin American Republics at the Mexico City Conference presented their own list of desired changes; the United States, with some difficulty, managed to prevent their being adopted formally and it was finally agreed that they should be offered to the San Francisco meeting only in the form of suggestions for consideration. The Latin Americans wanted the world organization to move rapidly and strongly toward universality. They wanted clear-cut, specific declarations of principles and purposes. The Assembly should be stronger and its purposes better defined, and this should be the case with the World Court as well. A special agency should be set up for international moral and intellectual coöperation. Latin America should at all times have adequate representation on the Security Council. Nothing should be done to impair the right of the Western Hemisphere to move collectively to suppress aggression.

On a previous occasion, it had been indicated that the Latin American powers wanted the following changes: no veto right for a member of the Big Five in the Security Council; a worldwide bill of rights; all states to adopt international law; all treaties to be registered; the Assembly to act by a vote of three-quarters of its members instead of two-thirds.

Another group of proposed amendments has been brought forward at various times by France, Brazil, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Venezuela, Belgium and Poland. They ask, in general: more power in the Security Council for the middle-sized and small nations; a clearer understanding about regional agreements; guarantees of sovereignty and existing territorial rights; clearer expression on the Atlantic Charter, the rights of man, justice and democracy.

Former President Herbert Hoover recently came forward with a list of seven points of his own, which may or may not represent the views of the extreme conservatives in the Republican Party. Mr. Hoover says that: definite political rights should be established for individuals and for nations; treaties should be revised every ten years; there should be regional organizations in Asia, Europe and the Western Hemisphere; the enemy countries should be disarmed and the United Nations should reduce their own armament and bring it into balance with the population and resources of each power. American military strength should be used only if the President and a majority of the members of the Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses agree. Finally, said Mr. Hoover, don't hurry the organization; take enough time to get it right.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a leading conservative Republican member of the United States Senate, urges that the new League should have the power to review and modify wartime political decisions made by the chief leaders of the United Nations. Undoubtedly Mr. Vandenberg has in mind in particular the boundaries of Poland. He has also suggested that the peace-keeping function of the new league should be somewhat simplified by creating a separate military alliance of the Big Five which should guarantee the permanent military subjugation of Germany and Japan.

A great deal has been said about the problem of reconciling Dumbarton Oaks with existing regional agreements. It now seems clear that the French government of General de Gaulle entered its new treaty with Soviet Russia with some hope that thereby Russia would be partially alienated from the "Anglo-American bloc" and from the Dumbarton Oaks system of collective security. Obsessed as always—and it is hardly surprising in view of their experience—with fear of German aggression, the French wanted an alliance with Russia, now by far the strongest military power in the Eastern Hemisphere, which would keep Germany permanently in check. It was a blow to this plan when, at Yalta, the Russians decided to subordinate their French treaty to the Dumbarton Oaks system. France fears that the new machinery might prove so clumsy and slow that the Germans could rain robot and rocket bombs on all her chief cities for days or weeks before the Security Council got around to declaring the Fourth or Fifth Reich an aggressor.

Somewhat similar fears were expressed at the Mexico City Conference, where for the first time it was agreed that all the American republics should bind themselves to the use of every possible measure, including eco-

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nomic and financial boycotts and even armed force, in case of aggression against any one of them, from any quarter. The Latins, many of whom think of the proposed security league as predominantly a European affair, do not want their prompt and effective action postponed or prevented by leisurely or adverse decisions taken outside this hemisphere.

Most serious of all are the objections raised in many quarters to the voting procedure in the Security Council. At the original Dumbarton Oaks Conference, disagreement on this subject was so grave that after the debate had gone on for weeks, it was left without conclusion and was later settled by the compromise of Yalta. At Dumbarton Oaks the representatives of Russia insisted that no one of the Big Five should be subject to hostile action, under a charge of aggression, by an adverse vote of a majority of the members of the Security Council. In other words, each of the Big Five should have the right of veto over any action against itself. At Yalta it was decided that any of the Big Five should have the right of veto over action involving economic, financial, military or other sanctions, not only in respect to itself but in respect to any other power. (The text of the agreement has not yet been published, but Secretary Stettinius at Mexico City gave out part of the information, and an anonymous State Department spokesman in Washington offered additional details some time later.)

This right of veto does not extend, however, to the act of investigation by the Security Council of charges against any nation, including the Big Five, or to publishing the results. Defenders of the formula argue that publicity is itself a tremendously effective weapon. They also point out that if the new League ever came to the pass where a formal charge of aggression was levied against any one of the Big Five, we should have war anyhow, and all this elaborate machinery would in all likelihood be destroyed.

While Russia was originally responsible for the insistence on a veto over action of the Security Council regarding allegations of aggression, the United States Senate would in all probability refuse to ratify a treaty containing the provision that this country might be declared an aggressor and subject to economic, financial and military sanctions, through a majority vote of an organization in which it had only one vote in eleven, and only one vote in five among the leading powers.

Less than four weeks before the opening of the San Francisco Conference, several matters suddenly arose to create anxiety among the friends of international organization. It was reluctantly admitted at the White House, after the New York *Herald Tribune* had made the charge, that Russia and the United States intended to ask at the San Francisco Conference for three votes each, in the Assembly, although every other one of the forty-odd nations to join the new league will have but one vote. Russia asked one vote for the USSR itself and one each for two of the units within it, the Ukrainian and White Russian Soviet Republics. The United States asked for three votes without making any territorial assignment in regard to them. A few days later, following a storm of public criticism, the United States abandoned its claim.

But before it had done so, Russia made a new demand. At the Yalta Conference it was agreed that the Warsaw Provisional Government of Poland should be broadened and democratized, and should then be generally recognized and welcomed into the United Nations. For some reason, however, this task went very slowly. On March 31, Russia requested that, if the changes in the Warsaw government had not been brought about by April 25, a delegation from it should nevertheless be seated at San Francisco. The United States and Great Britain rejected this request.

There were those who said that Russia did not expect her plea to be granted, and that when she made it she was thinking of another country far from Poland: Argentina. A few days earlier, the Argentine government had declared war on the Axis and announced its willingness to sign all the agreements reached at the Mexico City Conference of the American republics. Presumably there was now nothing to prevent her from joining the United Nations and having a seat at San Francisco. Yet as all the world knew, Argentina remained a fascist dictatorship, strongly sympathetic at heart to those other fascist dictators, Francisco Franco and Adolf Hitler. It was thought likely that Russia raised the case of Poland knowing the vote would be negative and hoping thereby to establish a precedent for another negative vote in the case of Argentina.

From this outline we trust it is evident what Dumbarton Oaks is not, as well as what it is. It is not a super-state; there is little if any actual surrender of that sovereignty which some individuals consider so important. It is not a social revolution; capitalist countries will continue as capitalist as ever. There is no direct guarantee for better treatment—up to and including freedom—for colonies or dependencies. It is not a renunciation of power by the United States, Great Britain and Russia, which now dominate most of the world and will dominate all of it when the Axis is defeated. The new security organization is heavily rigged in their favor on the ground that responsibility must go with power. The framers of the new document obviously felt that the former League of Nations failed partly because it did not give adequate recognition to this principle. Certainly this is no attempt to reach Utopia at one bound. It is rather an attempt to regularize and broaden somewhat, at the end of the war, the power situation then existing, and to go on from there with the possibility that out of this beginning a true, just and complete concert of the nations may ultimately grow.

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Criticism from the Internationalists

MUCH OF THE DISAPPOINTMENT with Dumbarton Oaks comes from those who want, not a lower degree of international organization, but a higher one. The aspiration of persons who express these criticisms is to create a true international government, on the basis of democracy and equality. They point out that the security provisions of Dumbarton Oaks would create what is virtually a dictatorship by three or five great powers. The world in general would have no recourse but to trust itself to their good will and good judgment. Such an arrangement, say the objectors, is not compatible with the impartial rule of law.

In terms of formal political logic there is much to be said for this position. Nevertheless, if one is to test it as a criticism of the proposal which has actually been made, one must have in mind the type of organization which would be necessary to embody the ideals of the critics, so that a fair comparison of relative effectiveness and practicability can be made. For a government is not merely a set of ideas put down on paper; it is an organization of power and interest aimed at the achievement of concrete results.

First of all, it must be recognized that a world organization which gave equal voting power to every sovereign nation would be very far from embodying the aspiration of the internationalists. It would be much more closely comparable with the worst type of "rotten-borough" political system. If it is thought that the basis of representation should be population, there certainly would be no justice or wisdom in giving Luxembourg, with her 300,000, the same voting power as China with her 460 million, or the Soviet Union with its 190 million. If economic or military power were to be taken into consideration, the score would be still more uneven. The populations of the Big Five come close to a majority of the population of the world.

If we were to create an ideally democratic world government, its legislature probably should not represent existing governments at all, but should be elected directly by the people, voting in roughly equal electoral districts, or through some form of professional or functional organization. It may be that this is the form of international organization toward which we should work. Nevertheless, it is wholly beyond the realm of possibility at present. Large areas have not made enough progress toward democratic institutions so that elections of this type would be generally feasible. Even the democratic peoples are not sufficiently ready to abandon their several national loyalties to bypass their existing governments in this way. We must for the time being, if we are to have a security organization, consent to have it composed of national states.

It might theoretically be more equitable to give the states voting powers on the basis of their respective populations. But this does not accord with practical necessities, or with the end in view. Americans need only ask themselves whether they would be willing to entrust power over the use of their armed forces to a body in which China had three times as many votes as they did, in order to see why this is so.

The nature of this security organization is dictated by its specific and limited purpose, which is to discourage, and, if necessary, to oppose by force of arms any aggression of the sort recently undertaken by Germany and Japan. There is no way to do this except by facilitating unified action, and prompt action, on the part of the nations which have the requisite military and economic power. The reality of the situation is that these nations will not delegate the use of their power to any government other than one which they can control. It is to the interest of all smaller nations that their power be organized for the end in view. Complicated voting provisions or constitutional safeguards which might interfere with this objective would substitute the shadow for the substance. Failure to establish a security organization would not rob the great nations of the power which they have, and may use in any event. Unified action on the part of these nations is not likely to have such disastrous consequences to the rest of the world as a split among them, which would certainly make more likely another world war. There is no guarantee that, if united, they will not use their power oppressively, but there is no practical alternative to legalizing their ability to use it. We can only rest in the belief that, under foreseeable circumstances, the Big Five are not likely to wish to disturb the peace of the world, or to oppress other peoples.

This was acknowledged by their enemies before the present war when they were attacked on the ground that they were "satisfied powers." Their territorial enlargement is a matter of history, and the intelligent self-interest of none of them would be likely to lead to a new career of conquest. The chief concern of each is intensive cultivation of its own resources and culture; each therefore has the most substantial reasons to avoid the destruction and miseries of war. There is little in the accepted ideological concepts of the British and American democracies, of Russian communism, or of China, which glorifies military conquest or romanticizes aggressive war. There might be more danger of economic exploitation on the part of one or more of them, but their leaders generally recognize that the age of colonial imperialism has passed and that the chief task of the future is to increase the production and the purchasing power of the more backward regions.

Another criticism of Dumbarton Oaks from the side

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of the internationalists is that it does not provide for a genuine government with anything like complete sovereignty. They hoped, for instance, that there would be a truly internationalized police force owing allegiance only to the international government. They wished for an international judiciary which would have a closer connection with the world organization than the present World Court seems likely to enjoy. They wanted an international legislature with law-making powers, and an executive which would supervise world activities throughout the whole realm of human welfare.

It must be acknowledged that the United Nations, as foreshadowed at Dumbarton Oaks, will be far from international government in this sense. Yet there is a grave question whether it would be wise to transfer to the world sphere the concept of a single government exercising complete sovereignty with which we are familiar in the case of national states. Certainly the peoples are not yet ready to accord the requisite degree of loyalty to a world state. Even national states are tending more to emphasize the creation of functional and nearly autonomous agencies for special purposes rather than building up an undifferentiated governmental power. For instance, in the United States we set up a Federal Reserve System or a Tennessee Valley Authority and then let them attend to their specific jobs without much detailed direction from above. Certainly in such a vast, varied and untried field as international government, we should be well advised not to try to cover every possible activity with centralized constitutional power, but rather to create specific functional agencies for the several important tasks, designing each in a way appropriate to the job to be done.

Thus we have the security proposals of Dumbarton Oaks, for the purpose of checking armed aggression, with one type of representation and control. We have the Bretton Woods proposals for exchange stabilization and international investment, under quite a different scheme of representation and control. We have UNRRA already functioning for its limited purposes. If existing plans go through, there will be a world food organization and other bodies.

There should, of course, be any necessary coördination among these various activities. Nevertheless, the wisdom of developing international agencies in this way rather than through a single international government is obvious. As David Mitrany has pointed out, we can in each of these functional agencies allow representation according to the specific interests involved rather than according to some hard-and-fast general scheme. We can alter or abandon them as occasion requires without resorting to cumbersome constitutional processes. We can seek directly the ends we have in view without recourse to abstract political principles.

The functional form of administration is greatly to be preferred to the formal and all-embracing world state, at least in the early stages of international government. If our experience should indicate that something of a more general nature is necessary, it can be added at a later time. It is entirely conceivable, however, that we shall accomplish the purposes for which world government is invoked more efficiently, with a lighter load of irrelevant considerations, and with less chance of arbitrary oppression, if we never create a world state on the nineteenth-century model of the national state.

The Question of Sovereignty

FOR THE SECOND TIME in a generation the nations of the world are attempting to build an international organization to maintain national security and universal peace. For the second time, also, they are formally building it on the basis of a principle which, in the words of the Dumbarton Oaks text, recognizes "the sovereign equality" of states. But in spite of its being explicitly mentioned, isolationist and nationalist opponents of American participation in an international organization are already raising the cry that we are surrendering our sovereignty.

The concept of sovereignty is a hangover from the age of absolute monarchy when it was the personal attribute of kings, princes, dukes and ecclesiastical potentates. Sovereignty meant the ruler's absolute power, unrestrained by law, over persons and things within his realm. Sovereignty was real in both fact and law because it reflected the actual power situation in the post-feudal monarchical state.

With the decline of absolutism, the emergence of the middle class as a political force claiming to speak in the name of the "people," and the recognition of the supremacy of constitutional law over government, the definition of sovereignty underwent numerous changes. Both "origin" and "location" as well as "limits" of sovereignty became subjects of animated dispute among political scientists and constitutional lawyers. Who is sovereign? The people? The legislature? The state? The constituent power? Can sovereignty be divided and shared between law-making and law-enforcing agencies? Is it subject to constitutional law? Efforts to adjust the original principle to the reality of the modern democratic state led to its complete fictionalization and depersonalization.

But the very existence of the debate suggests that government has become a meaningless and, for the purposes of the democratic state, useless concept of politics. The competitive struggle for power and ad-

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vantages waged by special interest groups—business organizations, labor unions, farmer associations, professional societies—by political parties and other organizations claiming to speak in the name of public interest, as well as the conflicts among government agencies, local and national, all of these indicate the futility of either looking for or postulating the need of sovereignty in the domestic politics of the democratic state. The concept of sovereignty is as outmoded as the rule that "the King can do no wrong."

While a democratic government would be laughed out of court if it tried to speak in the name of sovereignty in internal matters, in international politics the inviolability of a state's alleged sovereignty, *i. e.*, the right to conduct its foreign policy as it pleases, still is the battle cry of conservative international lawyers and politicians. In reality, however, were sovereignty permitted to be a guide for conduct, international anarchy would be the inevitable result. In fact, all international treaties—from those on fisheries and preferential tariffs to conventions on the treatment of war prisoners and the arbitration of justiciable disputes—infringe upon and limit a state's conduct of foreign affairs. The explanation that treaties are a form of "self-limitation" is as fictitious as the so-called "internal sovereignty" of a state.

The fiction of the "sovereign equality" of nations, therefore, is retained in Chapter II, paragraph one, of the Dumbarton Oaks Charter for no good purpose. On the contrary, the whole purpose of the international security organization envisaged by the Charter is to end once and for all a nation's unlimited right to be its own judge in its relations with another nation. The elimination of the unanimity rule in both the Assembly and the Security Council and the requirement that a nation which is a party to a dispute abstain from voting, make sovereignty completely the unreality that it has always been since the development of a law of nations.

Similarly, the concept of the equality of states, though nominally retained, is actually discarded by the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Charter which recognize that the maintenance of peace and security is the primary responsibility of the great powers. The concept of equality, transferred as an abstraction from the individual to the state, is as unreal as the conception, once widely accepted in our own constitutional law, that the modern industrial corporation is a person. Admission of the actual inequality of states in terms of economic and political power does not imply, of course, that the smaller nations are legally at the mercy of the big ones. As formulated in the Dumbarton Oaks Charter, the issue really is not a great power's ability to intervene arbitrarily in a small country's internal affairs, but the wise use of the power of intervention by the big nations, acting in concert, when a small country's domestic politics seems to endanger the peace.

Unreal from a historical point of view, confusing in their semantic meaninglessness and irrelevant with regard to the needs of modern international law and relations, the concepts of "sovereignty" and "equality" are social myths whose translation into political slogans by nationalists and chauvinists represents a continued threat to the peace of the world. Their retention is deliberately designed to arouse the most primitive emotions of the citizen against international coöperation and understanding. Hidden behind them are the basest motives of self-interest and avarice. Although the Dumbarton Oaks Charter is "in principle" based on the "sovereign equality" of nations, it is the first universal treaty which, if applied vigorously, promises to guarantee international peace by eliminating this sovereignty in practice.

Half a Loaf or No Bread

Opponents of American participation in the new security organization, as for example those in the United States Senate, and the editors of the isolationist press, rarely admit that they want the scheme to be rejected. To be sure, they make specific criticisms about it, some of which we have summarized above. They say this is not a true international organization but a concert of the Allies. It does nothing about economic or political imperialism, it subordinates the middle-sized and small powers, it does not have an international police force of its own with which to put down instances of aggression, it tends to freeze unjust territorial and other decisions of the Allies. But rarely does an opponent have sufficient candor and courage to admit that he wants this country to stay out of the new organization as it stayed out of the League of Nations in 1920. On the contrary, he argues, as a rule, that the United States should delay its entrance until we see what kind of peace is being written, and whether we want to condone that peace by joining the organization which will inevitably be founded upon it.

To be sure, events have somewhat moved past the men and periodicals which support this view. Since they began to argue for it, the United States has played a leading role in the conference of Dumbarton Oaks (held in our own national capital) and at Yalta. It is now preparing to play a dominating role in the third conference. Moreover, the wait-and-see school was badly shaken by the defection of Senator Vandenberg. He has accepted a place on the American delegation and has agreed to be bound by the unit rule, under which the entire delegation votes solidly

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in favor of any action supported by a majority of its members. In his famous Vandenberg plan, which had the tentative support of at least 70 members of the Senate, 6 more than the necessary two-thirds, he suggested merely a separate military alliance of the victorious Allies to prevent future aggression by the Axis, and an agreeement that political decisions made now can be reopened after the war for the sake of remedying what may then seem to be injustices. Since the Allies will in any case make a firm attempt to stick together after the fighting ends, and since all political decisions in any part of the world are constantly open to possible reconsideration, these two conditions do not seem very serious. Certainly they do not conflict with the development of the new organization, unless the Russians should needlessly take alarm and should feel that notice was being served on them that the Anglo-American powers intend, without consultation, to tear up the Polish settlement.

The argument that the United States should insist upon a just settlement after the present war, and should refrain from endorsing Dumbarton Oaks until we are sure that the settlement will be just, may seem to have a certain degree of plausibility. After the last war many conscientious liberals, including the board of editors of the *New Republic* as then constituted, took this position. But we feel that a quarter of a century's experience would cause most of the same people to make a different judgment today. In the first place, absolute justice in human affairs is impossible of attainment. If one were to wait for it, he would wait forever. Everyone is forced to compromise with reality at some point; the question is, at what point, and how serious will the compromise be?

Some harsh things have been said about the territorial settlements already made, or proposed, as a result of the war. We do not have space here to discuss all of them, but a few points should be made.

Fixing the Curzon Line as approximately the boundary between Poland and Russia is a decision which, both ethnographically and politically, seemed reasonable to most Americans when it was first proposed 25 years ago. Poland took the territory east of that line by force of arms at a time when Russia was prostrate.

Dividing East Prussia between Russia and Poland is a much more dubious action. In its favor can be said, however, that ever since the last war East Prussia has been a geographical monstrosity, separated as it is from the rest of Germany by the Polish Corridor. Against the plan is the difficulty as to what to do with the German population now living in East Prussia. If it is left where it is, it would become another minority problem, of which we have seen too many already. To move it into the interior of Germany proper would be an enormous task, and would increase the size of a German population whose future livelihood will at best present grave difficulties.

As for the other boundary changes that are proposed, our present judgment is that all of them are unwise if our chief criterion is to create a Europe where another great war is unlikely. The Allies evidently have not yet decided whether they want a Carthaginian peace, or one in which an effort is made to bring a chastened and purified Germany back into the society of nations. Clearly, you cannot do both of these things at once. As we have said previously, any settlement in Germany should satisfy three conditions: It should make another world war less, and not more, likely. It should not include provisions which are abhorrent to the moral sensibilities of the peoples of the victorious powers. It should not be based upon an assumption of the continuance of the present alliance beyond any reasonable life expectation for such an alliance. Judged by these standards, the territorial settlements proposed, such as giving Poland Silesia and Pomerania as far as the Oder, giving France the Rhineland, or putting it under international control, giving German territory to Belgium and the Netherlands, seem dubious, to say the least.

These proposals have the further disadvantage that they look backward and not forward. We hope and believe that the world is moving toward a time when boundaries, nationality and sovereignty will have less and less importance, when trade will be more and more able to ignore national frontiers, when economic, financial and cultural units will grow larger and larger. Whatever emphasizes physical possession by one power or another of any few hundred square miles of territory is out of harmony with this concept. What people need is prosperity, security, education and a sense of cultural oneness with all mankind, not the hysterical, flag-waving emotion which helped to wreck Germany.

It is possible of course that the victorious Allies will make the territorial adjustments mentioned above. But even if they do, these boundary changes are not being frozen for all time to come. The machinery of the new league of nations contains ample provision under which boundaries and all other international relationships can be reëxamined and injustices rectified. On the other hand, if we turn our backs on the new league, there is no way of rectifying anything except by war.

Those who say that the United States should alone abstain from the new organization until we see whether it and the peace terms are just or unjust, while the rest of the world struggles to bring a new international order into being, are guilty of a shocking ambivalence. In one frame of reference they see this country playing what is probably the major role in winning the war and determining, by its sheer weight and power, the world future; yet in another they see us as a mere passive onlooker. The two roles they assign to the United States are so far apart that it is impossible to believe the dual interpretation is put forward in good faith.

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If Dumbarton Oaks Should Fail

A WISE MAN, in contemplating any given course of action, must consider also what possible alternatives there are. If the United States should reject membership in the new security organization, what consequences may reasonably be expected to flow from that rejection? What else shall we be doing?

The first question we must ask is whether the rest of the world can create, and continue with, such an organization even though the United States stays out. We stayed out last time, and the League broke down within 15 years; most independent observers would say that it had disintegrated in regard to its most important function, the maintenance of peace, by 1935, when it failed to halt, or even to make any serious effort to halt, the attack on Ethiopia by Italy.

It seems fairly clear that the new security organization can hardly fulfill any of its important functions without the participation of the United States. Almost alone among the great nations, this country will emerge from the war with its economy and equipment intact. Most other countries are wholly or partially bankrupt, their cities partially destroyed, their agriculture disturbed, their transport in chaos.

So far as the peace of Europe is concerned, there is already evident a strong tendency toward a division of the Continent into two spheres of influence, British and Russian. With an international organization in existence, and the United States acting as a counter-balance, this development need not be inimical to peace. With the United States turning its back on Europe, and with only a dim prospect that the new league will be any more successful without us than the old one was, this rivalry between the British and the Russians might become extremely serious. France has already tried to play off one power against the other and has failed. Germany would be sure to try to do so and would have a better chance of success as the wartime psychological illusions of friendly coöperation are dissipated in the cold and harsh climate of postwar realities.

If, then, the new league disappears, or becomes only a useless piece of window-dressing with the United States out, what is to be expected?

In the first place, a resumption of the competitive armament race on a greater scale than ever before. The United States can probably get ahead and keep ahead in this race, but it will be at a fearful cost. The overwhelming weapon of the future, in spite of certain disappointments during this war, will be the airplane; and it is subject to technological obsolescence at a rate unheard of with any other weapon of the past. Some war planes are out of date before they have reached the front, or even before they have got into mass production. Hitler lost this war because of four or five successive blunders, one of which was that he froze the designs of the Luftwaffe a few months too soon. The British, who had delayed more by accident than design, put a superior fighter into the sky and thus, by the narrowest margin, avoided being knocked out of the war. In all probability, the cost of keeping up armament will in the future be to its cost in the past as the expense of this war is to that of 1914-18.

To be sure, the man in the street will ask: "Of whom shall we be afraid? Our enemies are defeated and our allies are our friends." But this is an illusion of security which is dissipated quickly in any war once the actual fighting stops. Following the disarmament conference of 1921, the race in armament production had been resumed long before it had become plain who were the potential enemies and allies. The danger of a lightning thrust with rocket and robot bombs will make the pressure for heavy armament all the greater.

Second, we must prepare for economic warfare on a gigantic scale. If the Senate will not accept Dumbarton Oaks, it will certainly not accept Bretton Woods; and the only alternative today to international economic cooperation is international economic warfare. That means bilateral trade agreements, tariffs, quotas, special types of currency to subsidize special activities. It means competitive depreciation of currency; we shall almost certainly be under pressure to cheapen the external value of our dollar or suffer a heavy disadvantage in the markets of the world. The United States is the last and only great nation left which still intends to try a very large measure of unalloyed "free enterprise"; it would seem questionable judgment, then, for us to turn our backs on the one international situation which gives free enterprise in the export field any chance of success.

If the United States will not accept Dumbarton Oaks or Bretton Woods, we are most unlikely to accept—or to be permitted by the other powers to accept—such international agreements as those in aviation, oil and food. In regard to oil, for example, we shall then participate in a cutthroat struggle for new sources of oil outside the United States—in Iran, by intriguing against the British and French; in Latin America, by combating the natural desire of the people of the countries concerned to keep these resources for themselves. In aviation, which is now so completely worldwide that travel within any one country is a casual and unimportant matter, our private enterprisers will be working against the heavily subsidized worldwide lines of other countries, and working, moreover, in an atmosphere of animosity and distrust. The rest of the world will be told that the Americans have let them down once more and we shall be again, as we were in the late twenties and the early thirties, the best hated country on earth.

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Rejection of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund would be a heavy blow at American foreign trade. Most of those who will be our potential good customers after the war, while ultimately excellent risks, are at the present moment in such bad shape that they can borrow funds with which to put themselves back on their feet, from private sources, only at outrageous, if not prohibitive, rates of interest and with outrageous, if not prohibitive, collateral. (One of the strongest, most conservative European nations was recently required, in borrowing for commercial purposes in the United States, to put up *collateral of 100 percent, in gold.*) Without the Fund, as we said above, they have strong reason to depreciate the value of their currency at our expense.

To be sure, we now realize that foreign trade is not the magic panacea we once thought it was. In the long run we must import as much as we export, so that employment in the export industries is not all velvet. We are beginning to relinquish the simple-minded notion of the Hoover era, that a creditor nation can go on indefinitely exporting in large quantities without importing, merely lending the foreign customers the money with which to buy. Yet foreign trade can still be important, if we export the things which we can produce to greatest advantage, and import those which we can produce not at all, or to the least advantage. Foreign trade on that basis can play an important part in maintaining high and permanent prosperity. That is why, on the whole, a vote against international coöperation is a vote for bread lines and apple sellers.

In short, if we reject Dumbarton Oaks, even by pretending that we intend merely to wait and see how the peace comes out, we act for a return to the international anarchy that existed prior to 1914, made infinitely worse by the shrinkage in the size of the globe since then and the far greater interdependence of the nations with one another. We go back to a tremendous armament race, the increasing threat of war, dangerous economic rivalry, the whole dreary business of spheres of influence, alliances, power politics, and the bare and mean lives for millions of people which are the inevitable concomitant. It is not a spectacle which even the hardened isolationist can view with much pleasure.

Will It Be Ratified?

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT undoubtedly considered that his most sacred obligation, after the winning of the war, was the creation of a stable peace. He feared that a Senate minority might prevent his achieving this goal, just as such a minority had frustrated Wilson. For this reason, among others, he decided last July that his chances would be strengthened if the presiding officer of the Senate had more influence with the Senators than Henry Wallace could possibly have. Thus it was that Harry Truman became Vice President . . . and then President.

The sudden death of President Roosevelt and his replacement by a former Senator with the closest personal relationships with most of the members of the present Senate may change considerably the possibility of approving the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. On the one hand, President Roosevelt's great knowledge of foreign affairs and his genius for negotiation will be lacking and it will thus become more difficult to reach acceptable proposals at San Francisco. But on the other hand, in so far as Senate ratification is concerned, the personal animus that existed against Roosevelt in the hearts of the die-hards will also be lacking. Indeed, the Roosevelt memory is likely to prove far stronger, at least in the short run, than the living Roosevelt was. Quite possibly these various factors may cancel each other out. In any case, it is still too soon after President Roosevelt's death to predict how the situation in the Senate will be changed, if at all.

On November 5, 1943, 85 of the 90 Senators present in the Upper House voted in favor of a resolution proposed by Senator Tom Connally urging "that the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, join with free and sovereign nations in establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world." Only five of the Senators present voted against the Connally Resolution: Langer, La Follette, Shipstead, Wheeler and Nye, the last-named absent from the Seventy-ninth Congress. On the basis of this overwhelming senatorial mandate, strengthened considerably by last November's election results, one might suppose that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which call for a minimal commitment on the part of each contracting nation, might have no difficulty in obtaining the two-thirds senatorial approval required by the American Constitution. Yet no American in his right mind ever really supposed that such would be the case.

The wide gap between the vote on the Connally Resolution and the expected roll call on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals is essentially the same divergence that always exists between support for an abstract principle and acceptance of a historical reality.

Isolationism is an attitude of mind with respect to a whole gamut of issues, rather than a vote on one roll call. The extreme danger in which the Bretton Woods proposals now find themselves in Congress is proof that isolationism is still very much alive. Another proof, if one were needed, is to be found in the limitations placed on Lend-Lease in this year's renewal,

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limitations which the Republican leadership forced upon an Administration which was understandably disinclined to engage in controversy at this time. Nationalism, pacifism, imperialism, Russophobia and Anglophobia are all aspects of what we call isolationism, and all are present in the Senate.

The confusion that exists in the minds of many of the Senators is largely a reflection of public confusion on the whole question of peace. One example will suffice: In January, 1943, the National Opinion Research Center found that 84 percent of Americans favored our joining a union of nations after the war. But only 62 percent favored our joining "if the United States has only the same amount of power in the union as Great Britain," and only 55 percent favored our participation if the Soviet Union shared equality in the world organization. It would be an interesting pastime to try to figure out what goes on in the minds of the 29 percent of our population who somehow believe that the Soviet Union would, or should, accept a subordinate role in an international organization established to keep the peace. Whatever the explanation may be, this is the kind of confusion that invalidates the vote on the Connally Resolution and makes a two-thirds vote in the Senate extremely precarious.

It is too often optimistically assumed that it takes 33 votes, or one-third of the 96 Senators plus one, to defeat a treaty. In fact, however, one-third of a quorum plus one can prevent passage of a treaty. Since a quorum in the Senate is a mere majority, that is 49, the number of isolationist votes needed to defeat Dumbarton Oaks ranges from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 33, depending on how many members are present on the fateful day. With these figures in mind, it has of late been an open season for counting isolationist noses.

It is not completely accurate, or even fair, to assume that all pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists will vote against Dumbarton Oaks. After all, Pearl Harbor itself was a lesson in history to millions of Americans, including some of the Senators. Consequently, no roll-call "batting averages" can be accepted as certain indications of future votes. Republican Senators Aiken of Vermont and Tobey of New Hampshire are two cases in point. They both had stanch pre-Pearl Harbor isolationist records, voting against Lend-Lease, draft extension, ship seizure and the Neutrality Act revision. Yet both voted for the renewal of reciprocal trade agreements and funds for UNRRA (and incidentally for the confirmation of Henry Wallace and Aubrey Williams), and Senator Tobey is an active sponsor of the Bretton Woods agreements. Most Washington experts consider Senators Bridges of New Hampshire and Brewster of Maine far more doubtful, although both had strong interventionist records before Pearl Harbor.

There have been at least three published analyses of the probable breakdown on Dumbarton Oaks. *PM's* poll (March 13) found 49 Senators answering unequivocally "yes," 4 probably "yes," none positively "no," 34 "reservationists," and 9 unavailable for comment. However, *PM's* "reservationists" included those who said "their answer depended on specific conditions," and this might mean almost any Senator who just doesn't like to answer polls, despite the fact that *PM* mentioned no names.

The *New Republic's* T. R. B., using "one of the highest Administration members" as his source (March 26), indicated the high figure of 70 for ratification, the very low figure of 12 as against ratification, and 13 as doubtful. Finally, Paul Sifton in the UDA Congressional Newsletter of March 15, making use of careful analyses by private agencies in close touch with the Senate, produced an entirely different estimate: 45 for ratification with varying degrees of enthusiasm, 17 as doubtful but leaning toward world organization, 8 as doubtful but leaning toward isolation, 20 as definitely isolationist, 5 as having voted isolationist but now tending toward world coöperation, and one, the ineffable "Happy" Chandler of Kentucky, in a class all by himself as having voted for world coöperation but talked against it.

Both Sifton and T. R. B. give names, and their differences, which are many, only serve to indicate how tenuous the whole proposition really is. For example, Sifton's list of die-hards includes Senators Butler, Capper, Millikin, Revercomb, Shipstead, Wherry and Walsh, all of whom T. R. B.'s source considers doubtful.

The only conclusion which a sane commentator can reach at this date is that the issue of America's participation in a world organization as it will be determined by the vote of the present Senate, is very much in the balance. The issue is so fraught with significance for the future of the world that it is difficult to realize that the next few weeks, or months at most, will probably decide it one way or the other. Four factors, as yet to be finally determined, will influence the decision.

1. *The course of world events.* As any chart of public-opinion polls will indicate, the enthusiasm for or against a given issue varies considerably as events impinge upon that issue. To go back only a few weeks, any lay observer could have noted the increase in sentiment for international organization following the Crimean Conference, the deepened skepticism after the deal on voting procedure for the Assembly had been announced, and again, within 48 hours, with the Soviet demand for representation of the Lublin government, and then, in less than a week, the great surge of good will following the Soviet denunciation of its treaty with Japan. Undoubtedly this changing public mood will be reflected in the Senate, particularly among those Senators who are now considered in the doubtful category.

The success or failure of the efforts to effect a compromise in the Polish situation may make or break the

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A Post-War Program for Jews

A Summary of Recommendations Submitted by the American Jewish Committee to the President of the United States and State Department on March 20, 1945.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, organized in 1906 to protect the civil and religious rights of Jews throughout the world, believes that the status of Jews throughout the world must rest upon the same principles of equality and justice as that of other individuals and other peoples. Today the Jews, in addition to enduring the general suffering caused by the holocaust of war, have been the principal victims of the persecution that has sprung from the Hitler tyranny.

To comply with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals "to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms," the American Jewish Committee advocates the establishment of a permanent Commission on Human Rights, to be set up at the earliest possible moment by the United Nations Conference, to formulate an International Bill of Rights embodying the principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms, religious liberty and racial equality, and a course of procedure for the implementation and enforcement of the Bill.

Moreover, the United Nations should, by general agreement, declare public or organized incitement against religious and ethnic groups to be contrary to the principles and interests of world democracy.

The American Jewish Committee maintains that abrogation of all anti-Jewish legislation and administrative measures is integral to the establishment of any future democratic regime in the liberated countries.

In view of the fact that the millions displaced by the fortunes of war are generally expected to turn instinctively to their own countries, the American Jewish Committee proposes that all displaced persons, irrespective of creed, race or nationality, should be entitled to readmission to the country of their nationality. Moreover, no displaced person should be compelled to return to the country from which he was displaced.

In view of the fact that migration is a matter of international interest, and that a large number may seek to start their lives anew in some other country, the American Jewish Committee advocates the establishment of a Commission on Migration, under the Economic and Social Council of the General International Organization, which would work for the adoption and ratification of an international migration convention, based on the principle of non-discrimination between racial, religious and ethnic groups. The need for an international commission on migration is emphasized by the tragic destruction of nearly five million Jews in Axis dominated countries, many of whom could have been saved if other countries would have been willing to receive them as immigrants.

The Committee asks that full restitution be given the Jewish individuals, institutions and communities whose property has been seized, damaged or destroyed in Axis countries or in countries which have been under Nazi domination.

With regard to Palestine, the American Jewish Committee, reaffirming its special place in Jewish tradition and sentiment, continues to endorse the Balfour Declaration, which promised a homeland for Jews within the border of Palestine. It retains its opposition to the White Paper, which discriminates against immigration of Jews as such. The Committee feels that Palestine should, for the present, be administered under an international trusteeship to safeguard the growth and development of the Jewish settlement in Palestine and to prepare the country for self-government under a constitution and a bill of rights guaranteeing the rights of all inhabitants.

Recognizing that statelessness and the practice of denaturalization are conditions dangerous to the existence of the national state, the human community and the dignity of the human personality, the American Jewish Committee advocates the establishment of a Commission on Statelessness to be set up under the Economic and Social Council of the General International Organization, which would be the recognized national authority to protect the rights and welfare of all stateless.

The American Jewish Committee welcomes and supports the statement of American policy in regard to the punishment of Axis criminals and their associates made by the Department of State on February 1, 1945, through the Acting Secretary of State, the Honorable Joseph C. Grew. This statement calls for ". . . the punishment of German leaders and their associates for their responsibility for the whole broad criminal enterprise devised and executed with ruthless disregard of the very foundation of law and morality, including offenses, wherever committed, against the rules of war and against minority elements, Jewish and other groups, and individuals."

The American Jewish Committee feels that the acceptance in spirit, if not in detail, of the above recommendations will indicate that the future world order will be based upon ethical principles essential to the foundation of a just and durable peace.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

386 Fourth Avenue **New York 16, N. Y.**

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Senate's decision, much as confirmed internationalists may regret that so crucial a matter as world organization should stand or fall on this single issue. Political friction or harmony between Russia and her Western allies in Austria or Germany may likewise be decisive. Certainly the general atmosphere during the weeks following V-E Day will have enormous influence. If the end of the war in Europe leaves a feeling, not only of relief, but of great international good will, Dumbarton Oaks will be "in the bag." On the other hand, any very obvious fight for spheres of influence among the victorious powers could well result in a renewed wave of isolationism.

The key to the whole problem will be the timing of the vote. The Administration will make every effort to delay if the international situation is cloudy, and to bring the matter to a vote if the circumstances are propitious. On the other hand, the die-hard isolationists will use every parliamentary trick in the books, probably including a filibuster, to delay a final vote in the hope that some tragic discord may develop among the major powers which will bring enough of the fence-sitters over into the isolationist camp.

2. *The nature of the proposals.* It is still a moot question as to whether the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, as agreed upon by the Big Four, can be changed to any appreciable degree at San Francisco. Conceivably there could be something like a revolt of the smaller states, led by France or one of the "middle powers." In this case, the Big Four might decide to stick together and force through the original proposals, perhaps risking rejection by some of the smaller nations. In any case, we are in a position of trying to predict a Senate vote on a treaty, or a series of treaties, whose exact nature we do not yet know. The smoothness with which the San Francisco deliberations proceed and the degree of unanimity and good will with which the final proposals are approved by the conference will inevitably affect the Senate's vote.

Ironically enough, one of the reasons for optimism is that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, as they now stand, are a minimal agreement. In view of the veto power reserved to the Permanent Members of the Security Council, including the United States, no question of sovereignty is involved at all. The Senators are merely asked to approve the participation of this country in a world organization whose decisions with regard to the enforcement of peace we will accept *as long as we agree with those decisions.* If at any time we disagree with a proposal for punitive action, our single veto will prevent such action. While the isolationists have been blaming the Russians for insisting on this veto, it is clear that they would have been the first to raise the cry of "sovereignty" if there had been no veto.

3. *Arthur H. Vandenberg.* Clearly President Roosevelt, along with the rest of us, had been busily engaged in counting senatorial noses. As a result of his counting, he had decided to place a good many eggs in the Vandenberg basket. He had undoubtedly calculated that passage of a treaty making this country a member of a world organization could be prevented by the solid bloc of Republican stalwarts who, with the Democratic isolationists, almost succeeded in hamstringing the Administration's pre-Pearl Harbor program of aid to Britain, although only a majority vote was needed for passage of these measures. Senators Ball, Burton and Austin, long-time interventionists, do not represent sufficient Republican strength, even with the newer GOP internationalists. Consequently, Mr. Roosevelt selected Vandenberg as the most amenable of the Old Guard.

It is indeed disheartening to realize that a man with Vandenberg's record and his fundamentally reactionary point of view should be the key to the future peace of the world. It has been pointed out that the Michigan Senator is the only individual delegate to the San Francisco Conference who has already stated his complete position, with emphasis on his reservations. Perhaps Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers were overcome with too great enthusiasm when Vandenberg made his famous speech of January 10. However that may be, Vandenberg is the key. If he leaves San Francisco satisfied that the best possible results have been achieved, he can effect an almost overwhelming senatorial passage of the proposals. But if, for any reason, political or otherwise, Vandenberg is "disappointed" by the San Francisco results, he will be the Henry Cabot Lodge of this generation as the leader of the "reservationists." Senator Vandenberg is on the spot, but so are the peace-loving peoples of the world.

4. *The intensity of popular feeling.* Discounting all the ups and downs of public opinion, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals now have the overwhelming support of the American people, far more than two-thirds of them. Unless all present guesses are wrong, these proposals will not be so radically changed at San Francisco as to reverse this present trend. But the same trend existed after the last war, and yet Senator Lodge won his fight against the people. In 1945 ratification by the Senate may well depend on the extent to which the vast majority can arouse and organize its own energies so as to make a repetition of 1920 impossible. Apathy and over-confidence at this point would be fatal. This time the issue is being fought out after an election won by the forces of internationalism: Harding did not defeat Wilson last November. That simple political fact should be brought home to all Senators, and particularly to those who come up for reëlection in 1946 and 1948. If this is successfully done by an aroused people conscious of the price of defeat, the Seventy-ninth Senate may make at least partial atonement for the crime of its precedecessor in 1920. By doing so, this present Senate has the unique opportunity of building a shrine to the memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

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The Case for World Security

THE ESSENTIALS of a successful international organization are that it should combine adequate force with a rough approximation of justice, that it should represent the maximum agreement between the effective powers of the world, and that it should at some point cut through the tissue of argument and debate and begin the practical work of settling disputes without resort to war. Three-quarters of a century ago in the midst of a debate on the various possible methods of the resumption of specie payments, Horace Greeley made his famous statement: "The way to resume is to resume." Paraphrasing it, one may say of a world security organization: The way to begin is to begin.

This does not mean a callow pragmatism which would brush aside all questions as to the purposes and methods of world organization. A thorough thrashing out of those is necessary, which is the reason for the Great Debate that has been raging and will continue to rage even after a beginning has been made. But it does mean that where the purpose is to prevent the building up of a situation that may lead to war, a Hamlet-like indecision may in the end prove fatal.

The blueprint, of course, will be important. But whatever sort of blueprint is finally adopted to obtain world peace, there will be something more important than a blueprint behind it. For if any effective machinery is developed, it will come out of the massive determination of hundreds of millions of men and women that this will be the last war. And if the machinery runs well, it will run well only because there is a will to survive among the peoples of the world.

They will have still fresh in their minds the memory of the nineteen thirties when no cohesive will had been welded to resist fascist aggression until it was too late to prevent the war and almost too late to win it. They may still recall the fate of those nations who feared to endanger their "sovereignty" by joining an organization of collective security, and of those who trusted in their national self-sufficiency and thought they could lock themselves up in an airtight chamber in a sinking ship, and be safe.

They may also remember why the League of Nations failed. The sources of the League's failure have been long debated, and there are as many versions of it now as there were attitudes toward the League at the time. Few would fail to agree, however, that one of the sources was the lack of any will to apply real sanctions against aggression; that a second source was the paralyzing fear of Russia and her rising power and her new idea-system which hung over many of the early

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

The World Peace Foundation was founded in 1910 by Edwin Ginn to educate people to a full knowledge of the waste and destruction of war; to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and generally by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind. For many years the Foundation has been pursuing an active publications program with these ends in view.

In addition, it has been cooperating for the past two years with the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems under the chairmanship of Professor Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard University, in the publication and distribution of a series of brief analyses of some of the more important problems which will be facing us after the War.

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decisions of the League; that a third was the conversion of the League into the political instrument of several of the Great Powers; and that a fourth was America's failure to take an active and straightforward part in the League. We need not make these mistakes over again—although we undoubtedly shall if we are stupid.

Justice without force is as empty as force without justice is blind. There will be many questions to be fought out as to the detailed application of United Nations sanctions in the future. It would be a much better United Nations mechanism if it did not have the Yalta provision that no economic, financial, military or other sanctions could be applied to any of the great powers without the unanimous consent of all the great powers. This is easily the biggest single defect in the present plan when viewed from the standpoint of sanctions against great-power aggression. It may even prove a fatal defect. But it is better to start imperfectly than not to start at all. Once a start is made and the great powers grow less fearful of one another, mechanisms may be developed that will make it impossible for any great power to veto the use of sanctions against itself.

The League of Nations attempted an organization of justice without force. The Nazis attempted an organization of force without justice. We are ready for the third and final phase in which we shall make an effort to organize world justice and world peace through a world will with the ultimate sanction of force, and to direct the world will by the light of our best working ideas of justice.

This cannot be done if the world is divided against itself. The more closely we dig into the detailed history of the Versailles Peace Conference and the early years of the League, the clearer it becomes that the great peace failures of the past were traceable to the mutual fear and hostility of Western capitalism and Soviet socialism. Fascist aggression pounced upon this chance, and learned consummately the art of playing its two great enemies off against each other. The result was a long train of evils, from the initial failure to carry out German disarmament effectively to the last and tragic step of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939.

The hope that they will be able to split the Anglo-American world from the Soviet world is still the most persistent hope in the breasts of those who hate the United Nations idea and fear an accord between Russia and America. But the great difference between 1919 and 1945 is that we now have a four-year-old record of actual coöperation between these two halves of the United Nations world—a coöperation not only in fighting a coalition war but also in the diplomatic Teheran and Yalta conferences looking toward a postwar settlement. Every new agreement among the great powers means another blow at the intentions of those who hope to split them, another link forged in the chain of habituation in international action. The biggest thing about the Dumbarton Oaks agreement is the quite simple fact that it was an agreement and not a disagreement. It did include the will and intent of the Soviet segment of the future as well as the Anglo-American capitalist segment. It showed that, whoever may wish to divide them, these peoples do not intend to be divided.

This is not to gloss over the inherent danger that the security organization may be only a Concert of Powers. The boundary between a security organization and an alliance of the great powers is not always a clear one. There are many people who think that a world organization cannot start as a great-power alliance. They are wrong. Under present conditions, it is unlikely that it would start at all if it did not start thus. The real question is whether we shall allow it to end that way—merely as a great-power alliance. It must be pushed on until the strength of the great powers becomes the fulcrum of an effective world will, but within that world will the very strength that makes a world organization is curbed by it, and the desires of the smaller nations become an organic part of the whole.

The first danger that had to be met historically was the danger that the great powers would not agree at all. Once that danger has been met, we shall be in a better position to give our primary attention to the second danger—that the Big Three will agree all too well. This is the essential problem of all community order. The first danger is anarchy—that government will not function at all. The second danger is tyranny. The essence of a state is that the force of the government should finally be so completely knit into the *mores* of the community that the state eventually becomes a way of checking the very governmental power which formed the starting point.

Thus Dumbarton Oaks contains within itself the potential of another Council of Vienna, which would view the postwar world as spoils to be divided among the victors. But it also contains within itself the potential of a genuine world security organization. If we reject it because we fear the first potential, we thereby exclude any hope of achieving the second. The question of which of the two potentials will be realized depends not upon the Dumbarton Oaks agreement but upon what we do with it from now on.

This is to say that we have it in our own hands to determine whether power politics will be the outcome of Dumbarton Oaks or not. Those who grow faint-hearted at every new manifestation that the old-line power-politics diplomacy is still being played have little sense of historical perspective. It would be curious if generations of international anarchy and decades of hostility between the capitalist and socialist-idea systems could be wiped out almost overnight by a few meetings between the leaders of world opinion, by a few charters drawn up over their signatures, by a few words and acts of good will. The friction between the

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great powers today and the injustices imposed in many instances upon the smaller peoples are no proof that a world security organization is impossible. They are chiefly proof of its necessity.

What is more impressive is not that power politics still exists, but that the victory we have been forging over the Nazis has not long ago been completely broken by the disruptions between the great powers. A rational mind not scarred with the impulse to futility will start from the impressive areas of agreement that have already been achieved. Power politics is not a cause but an end-product—the end-product of the fear which the little nations have of the big powers, and the big powers have of each other. There can be no progress toward world security which does not operate toward wiping out that fear.

All modern warfare is based on the industrial potential of the warring nations. It is the machine that has revolutionized warfare, and it is upon the machine that successful warfare depends. The path to world power which Hitler charted out was aimed at paralyzing successfully the French, British and Russian industrial machines until finally he could turn to America with an overwhelming industrial power behind him. He failed when the three greatest industrial powers of the world combined against him. Those industrial powers, and particularly America and Russia, are today the key to world peace. If they fuse their war strength, they can make out of it a cohesive and unbreakable shield against any aggression. If they pledge that strength to the purposes of a world security organization, they themselves become in the end subject to a supervision of their power by the conscience of the world.

The great question about power when it is used as a control will always remain: *Quis custodiet custodes?* Who will watch the watchmen? The answer must lie in a machinery of world security which is started by the great powers but is institutionalized in the course of time by the rest of the world and can be used if necessity arises even when the aggressor is one of the crucial initiators of the organization.

But such a security organization will be futile unless America does this time what she did not do after the First World War—throw her entire strength and passion behind it. The American industrial plant today can turn out a greater volume of goods than the rest of the world combined. America is thus a decisive element in the world's future. If a sense of responsibility does not go along with our power, world peace will be doomed.

Once more, as in 1789, we stand at a strategic pass in the progress of mankind. At that time we experimented with a new kind of national federalism whose purpose was to show the world that a republic could be unified without abandoning the freedom of its parts. That question has now been transferred to a world plane, and once more America has a decisive role to play.

A SPIRITUAL DYNAMIC

Religion can and must be creative. Religion, in pointing to the ideal, should guard men's motives against hate, selfishness, and arrogance. It should also grant a total view of life, assuaging griefs and sorrows, while renewing hope and clarifying vision.

THE CHURCH PEACE UNION and WORLD ALLIANCE represent an interfaith body of men and women, who are convinced that all human beings are equally precious in God's sight and that the blessings and privileges of our common life must be shared by all.

THE CHURCH PEACE UNION and WORLD ALLIANCE believe that pronouncements are futile unless implemented by social sanctions and political action. They are, therefore, devoting all their facilities to a program of effectiveness in the following ways:

- Cooperation with local, state, and religious groups in strengthening the peace programs of the churches;
- Endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as the first essential step toward the establishment of a general international organization;
- Promotion of study of these proposals in the churches, with a view to improvements and amendments to strengthen the international organization;
- Campaign for a unified organized public opinion to secure, as soon as the United Nations have established the world organization, a vote of the Senate, making the United States a fully pledged member.
- Work for a more complete understanding by the churches and religious-minded people, of the importance of just economic adjustments as requisite to the establishment and maintenance of peace.
- Publication of a monthly *NEWS LETTER*, as well as pamphlets for the use of religious groups and individuals.
- Counsel with church workers on special problems of peace education through an *INFORMATION SERVICE;*
- Joint action with such organizations as the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Americans United for World Organization, Inc., American Association for the United Nations, Council for Democracy, Freedom House, and others in holding *Win the War—Win the Peace Institutes* in strategic centers of the nation.

The Church Peace Union and World Alliance are convinced that the realization of a better world order depends upon the devotion and cooperative effort of every individual.

THE CHURCH PEACE UNION
Rev. William P. Merrill, D.D., *President*

WORLD ALLIANCE for INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP through the CHURCHES
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Text of Dumbarton Oaks Charter

Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization

There should be established an international organization under the title of the United Nations, the charter of which should contain provisions necessary to give effect to the proposals which follow.

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES

The purposes of the organization should be:

1. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international coöperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems; and

4. To afford a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

CHAPTER II: PRINCIPLES

In pursuit of the purposes mentioned in Chapter I the organization and its members should act in accordance with the following principles:

1. The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.

2. All members of the organization undertake, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership in the organization, to fulfill the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the charter.

3. All members of the organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.

4. All members of the organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization.

5. All members of the organization shall give every assistance to the organization in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

6. All members of the organization shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken by the organization.

The organization should ensure that states not members of the organization act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER III: MEMBERSHIP

1. Membership of the organization should be open to all peace-loving states.

CHAPTER IV: PRINCIPAL ORGANS

1. The organization should have as its principal organs:
   A. A General Assembly;
   B. A Security Council;
   C. An International Court of Justice; and
   D. A Secretariat.

2. The organization should have such subsidiary agencies as may be found necessary.

CHAPTER V: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Section A—Composition

All members of the organization should be members of the General Assembly and should have a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter.

Section B—Functions and Powers

1. The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of coöperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the organization or by the Security Council; and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council.

2. The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the organization upon recommendation of the Security Council.

3. The General Assembly should, upon recommendation of the Security Council, be empowered to suspend from the exercise of any rights or privileges of membership any member of the organization against which preventive or enforcement action shall have been taken by the Security Council. The exercise of the rights and privileges thus suspended may be restored by decision of the Security Council. The General Assembly should be empowered, upon recommendation of the Security Council, to expel from the organization any member of the organization which persistently violates the principles contained in the Charter.

4. The General Assembly should elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council provided for in Chapter IX. It should be empowered to elect, upon recommendation of the Security Council, the secretary-general of the organization. It should perform such functions in relation to the election of the judges of the International Court of Justice as may be conferred upon it by the statute of the court.

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5. The General Assembly should apportion the expenses among the members of the organization and should be empowered to approve the budgets of the organization.

6. The General Assembly should initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international coöperation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare.

7. The General Assembly should make recommendations for the coördination of the policies of international economic, social and other specialized agencies brought into relation with the organization in accordance with agreements between such agencies and the organization.

8. The General Assembly should receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council and reports from other bodies of the organization.

Section C—Voting

1. Each member of the organization should have one vote in the General Assembly.

2. Important decisions of the General Assembly, including recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; election of members of the Security Council; election of members of the Economic and Social Council; admission of members, suspension of the exercise of the rights and privileges of members, and expulsion of members; and budgetary questions should be made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. On other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, the decisions of the General Assembly should be made by a simple majority vote.

Section D—Procedure

1. The General Assembly should meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require.

2. The General Assembly should adopt its own rules of procedure and elect its president for each session.

3. The General Assembly should be empowered to set up such bodies and agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER VI: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Section A—Composition

The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of eleven members of the organization. Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats. The General Assembly should elect six states to fill the non-permanent seats. These six states should be elected for a term of two years, three retiring each year. They should not be immediately eligible for reëlection. In the first election of the non-

"The maintenance of international peace and security inspires the highest hopes of the millions of fathers and mothers whose sons and daughters are engaged in the terrific struggle and suffering of war."

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Petition to the Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C.

We, the undersigned citizens of the State of New York, urge you to approve the Dumbarton Oaks, Bretton Woods, Mexico City and Crimea Conference proposals, without crippling reservations.

We believe these proposals for world unity will lead all peoples forward to a world security of peace and plenty. We urge the carrying out of these principles at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations.

NAME	ADDRESS	CITY

Copies may be obtained at
AMERICAN LABOR PARTY
570 Seventh Ave., New York 18, N. Y.

The above petition was issued on April 1, 1945, as a public service in a New York State campaign for two million signatures, by the

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permanent members three should be chosen by the General Assembly for one-year terms and three for two-year terms.

Section B—Principal Functions and Powers

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the organization, members of the organization should by the Charter confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and should agree that in carrying out these duties under this responsibility it should act on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the organization.

3. The specific powers conferred on the Security Council in order to carry out these duties are laid down in Chapter VIII.

4. All members of the organization should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

5. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the Security Council, with the assistance of the military staff committee referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 9, should have the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the organization.

Section C—Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Section D—Procedure

1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the organization. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgment may best facilitate its work. There should be periodic meetings at which each state member of the Security Council could if it so desired be represented by a member of the government or some other special representative.

2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional subcommittees of the military staff committee.

3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its president.

4. Any member of the organization should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the organization are specially affected.

5. Any member of the organization not having a seat on the Security Council and any state not a member of the organization, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute.

CHAPTER VII: AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. There should be an International Court of Justice which should constitute the principal judicial organ of the organization.

2. The Court should be constituted and should function in accordance with a statute which should be annexed to and be a part of the charter of the organization.

3. The statute of the Court of International Justice should be either (a) the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, continued in force with such modifications as may be desirable or (b) a new statute in the preparation of which the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice should be used as a basis.

4. All members of the organization should ipso facto be parties to the statute of the International Court of Justice.

5. Conditions under which states not members of the organization may become parties to the statute of the International Court of Justice should be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER VIII

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, INCLUDING PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION

Section A—Pacific Settlement of Disputes

1. The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Any state, whether member of the organization or not, may bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.

3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should, in each case, decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and ac-

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cordingly, whether it should take action under Paragraph 5.

5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Paragraph 3 above, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

6. Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the International Court of Justice. The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the Court, for advice, legal questions connected with other disputes.

7. The provisions of Paragraphs 1 to 6 of Section A should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned.

Section B—Determination of Threats to the Peace or Acts of Aggression and Action with Respect Thereto

1. Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with procedures indicated in Paragraph 3 of Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made under Paragraph 5 of Section A, constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the organization.

2. In general the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.

3. The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic, economic, or other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the organization to apply such measures. Such measures may include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

4. Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowered to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the organization.

5. In order that all members of the organization should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, they should undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves, armed forces, facilities and assistance necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or agreements should govern the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. The special agreement or agreements should be negotiated as soon as possible and should in each case be subject to approval by the Security Council and to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes.

6. In order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the organization there should be held immediately available by the members of the organization national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Paragraph 5 above.

7. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security should be taken by all the members of the organization in coöperation or by some of them as the Security Council may determine. This undertaking should be carried out by the members of the organization by their own action and through action of the appropriate specialized organizations and agencies of which they are members.

8. Plans for the application of armed force should be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Paragraph 9 below.

9. There should be established a Military Staff Committee the functions of which should be to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, to the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, to the regulation of armaments, and to possible disarmament. It should be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The committee should be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the organization not permanently represented on the committee should be invited by the committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities requires that such a state should participate in its work. Questions of command of forces should be worked out subsequently.

10. The members of the organization should join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

11. Any state, whether a member of the organization or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of measures which have been decided upon by the Security Council should have the right to consult the Security Council in regard to a solution of those problems.

Section C—Regional Arrangements

1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional

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agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX: ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

Section A—Purpose and Relationships

1. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in an Economic and Social Council.

2. The various specialized economic, social and other organizations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each such organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the organization on terms to be determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the General Assembly.

Section B—Composition and Voting

The Economic and Social Council should consist of representatives of eighteen members of the organization. The states to be represented for this purpose should be elected by the General Assembly for terms of three years. Each such state should have one representative, who should have one vote. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council should be taken by simple majority vote of those present and voting.

Section C—Functions and Powers of the Economic and Social Council

1. The Economic and Social Council should be empowered:

a. To carry out, within the scope of its functions, recommendations of the General Assembly;

b. To make recommendations, on its own initiative, with respect to international economic, social and other humanitarian matters;

c. To receive and consider reports from the economic, social and other organizations or agencies brought into relationship with the organization, and to coördinate their activities through consultations with, and recommendations to, such organizations or agencies;

d. To examine the administrative budgets of such specialized organizations or agencies with a view to making recommendations to the organizations or agencies concerned;

e. To enable the secretary-general to provide information to the Security Council;

f. To assist the Security Council upon its request; and

g. To perform such other functions within the general scope of its competence as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Section D—Organization and Procedure

1. The Economic and Social Council should set up an economic commission, a social commission, and such other commissions as may be required. These commissions should consist of experts. There should be a permanent staff which would constitute a part of the Secretariat of the organization.

2. The Economic and Social Council should make suitable arrangements for representatives of the specialized organizations or agencies to participate without vote in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it.

3. The Economic and Social Council should adopt its own rules of procedure and the method of selecting its president.

CHAPTER X: THE SECRETARIAT

1. There should be a Secretariat comprising a secretary-general and such staff as may be required. The secretary-general should be the chief administrative officer of the organization. He should be elected by the General Assembly, on recommendation of the Security Council, for such term and under such conditions as are specified in the Charter.

2. The secretary-general should act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, and of the Economic and Social Council and should make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organization.

3. The secretary-general should have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security.

CHAPTER XI: AMENDMENTS

Amendments should come into force for all members of the organization when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional process by the members of the organization having permanent membership on the Security Council and by a majority of the other members of the organization.

CHAPTER XII: TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Pending the coming into force of the special agreement or agreements referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 5, and in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 5 of the four-nation declaration signed at Moscow Oct. 30, 1943, the states parties to that declaration should consult with one another, and as occasion arises with other members of the organization, with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the governments having responsibility for such action.

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